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BIOPOLITICS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: FERTILITY POLICIES BETWEEN 
WOMEN’S  RIGHTS AND STATE AND COMMUNITY INTERESTS 
GILA STOPLER1 
In this Article, I argue that the liberal assumption that governments must not engage in 
biopolitics by setting fertility policies is flawed in both theory and practice. It is flawed in theory 
because  government  must  take  reproduction  into  account  in  order  to  ensure  individual  women’s  
rights to liberty and equality and to guarantee reproductive justice. It is flawed in practice since 
all governments set policies that directly and indirectly affect fertility, even if they do not name 
them fertility policies. Nevertheless, past and present experience have taught us that fertility 
policies set by states and communities to respond to their population needs have more often than 
not ignored the rights of the women recruited to carry them through. States have used women as a 
means to an end rather than as an end in themselves. 
In order to resolve this dilemma, I offer a test for assessing the legitimacy of fertility 
policies. In this Article, I identify three types of interests that fertility policies may serve: 
legitimate state and community interests, individual liberty interests, and individual equality 
interests. The validity of a given fertility policy should be assessed by examining it against these 
interests, and two rules should guide this examination. First, fertility policies should only be 
based  on  a  state’s  need  to  promote  legitimate  interests  (the  “legitimate  interests  prong”).  Second, 
due to the primacy of individual rights, even legitimate state and group interests in fertility can 
only  be  realized  while  respecting  and  promoting  individual  rights,  especially  individual  women’s  
rights,   to   both   liberty   and   equality   (the   “liberty   and   equality   prong”).   I   will   then   discuss   and  
examine various fertility policies from around the world, including the United States, in light of 
the suggested test. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I   cannot   imagine   anything   more   emphatically   a   subject   that   is   not   a   proper  
political or governmental activity or function or responsibility. . . . This 
government . . . will not . . . as long as I am here, have a positive political 
doctrine  in  its  program  that  has  to  do  with  the  problem  of  birth  control.  That’s  
not  our  business.” 
 
President Dwight Eisenhower, December 19592 
 
“More  state  abortion  restrictions  were  enacted   in  2011-2013 than in the entire 
previous  decade.”   
Guttmacher Institute3 
 
The United States fertility rate dropped in 2012 to a record low of 1.88 children per 
woman.4 This rate is below  the  replacement  level  of  2.1  children  per  woman,  which  is  “the  level  
at  which  a  given  generation  can  exactly  replace  itself.”5 The U.S. fertility rate has been below the 
                                                                
2  President Dwight Eisenhower, Transcript of the President’s  News  Conference  on  Foreign  and  Domestic  
Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1959, at 18. 
3  News in Context: More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire 
Previous Decade, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2014/01/02/index.html 
(summarizing findings of Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State Policy Review, 
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Mar. 28, 
2015)). 
4  Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2012, 62 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 9, 2013, at 1, 7 
(noting  the  decline  of  the  total  fertility  rate  in  the  United  States  to  “1,880.5  births  per  1,000  women”  in  2012). 
5  Id. at 7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/3
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recommended replacement level since 1971.6 Nevertheless, no official government policy has 
been crafted to try to reverse this trend. A major reason for this omission may be the prevailing 
U.S. perception that national governments have no business interfering with personal reproductive 
choices, as illustrated by President Dwight Eisenhower’s   quote   above.   Eisenhower’s   exact  
sentiments   are   echoed   in   Justice   Brennan’s   famous   words:   “If   the   right   of   privacy   means  
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether 
to  bear  or  beget  a  child.”7 Nevertheless,  apparently  unperturbed  by  Eisenhower’s  and  Brennan’s  
concerns, and perhaps in part in order to forestall the demographic decline, states have enacted 
more abortion restrictions in 2011 to 2013 than in the entire previous decade.8 
A   similar   approach   to   Eisenhower’s   nonintervention   approach   is   conveyed   in   Michel  
Foucault’s  1976  lecture  series  Society Must Be Defended.9 In his lectures, Foucault describes the 
emergence in the second half of the eighteenth century of a new form of state power (biopower) 
which  has  given  rise  to  a  new  form  of  state  politics  he  terms  “biopolitics.”10 Biopolitics seeks to 
control the population of the state through the regulation of processes  “such  as  the  ratio  of  births  
to  deaths,  the  rate  of  reproduction,  [and]  the  fertility  of  [the]  population.”11 Foucault distinguishes 
between conventional state power which is focused on the individual and seeks to discipline the 
individual body (anatomo-politics), and biopower and biopolitics, whose focus is on the entire 
mass of people—the population.12 According to Foucault, in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, for the first time in history, the population, as such, is seen as a political, scientific and 
biological problem, in which advances in the sciences, such as demography and medicine, allow 
the state to regularize and regulate.13 This is a worrying development for Foucault, who believes 
that a liberal state that respects individual rights simply cannot engage with biopolitics or with 
problems   of   population,   since   “[h]ow   can   the   phenomenon   of   ‘population,’   with   its   specific  
effects and problems, be taken into account in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects 
and individual free enterprise? In the name of what and according to what rules can it be 
managed?”14 
Foucault’s  concern  is  not  misplaced.  Many  countries  around  the  world,  from  China  and  
Romania to Israel, Japan and the United States, engage in biopolitics to varying degrees and with 
                                                                
6  Id. 
7  Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted). 
8  See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 2. See also U.S. Representative Bob  Goodlatte’s   remarks   during  
discussion of proposed anti-abortion legislation in the House Judiciary Committee, of which he is the chair. Laura Bassett, 
GOP   Congressman:   Limiting   Abortion   ‘Promotes   Job   Creation,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:07 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/15/bob-goodlatte-abortion-jobs_n_4604169.html. 
9  See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE 
FRANCE, 1975-76) (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., Picador 2003). 
10  Id. at 243. 
11  Id. In this Article, my interest in biopolitics   is   specifically   focused   on   government’s   influence   on  
reproduction and reproductive rights (and not, for example, on morbidity rates).  
12  Id. at 242-43. 
13  Id. at 245.  
14  MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1978-79, at 
317 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2008). 
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less than full attention to the rights of the individuals affected by their policies.15 Furthermore, not 
only states, but other communities, especially national and religious communities, engage in 
biopolitics,   and   contrary   to   Foucault’s   claim   that biopolitics is a new phenomenon, have been 
doing so for many generations.16 The best example of religiously-inspired biopolitics is the 
Genesis   proverb   “be   fertile   and  multiply,”17 which, perhaps because of its religious nature, has 
probably been the single most important and influential biopolitical act in the history of the world. 
Foucault’s  aversion  to  biopolitics  is  motivated  by  his  conviction  that  biopolitics  cannot,  
under any circumstances, be reconciled with individual rights. However, this Article will claim 
that  this  dichotomous  position  is  mistaken  and  can  be  attributed  at  least  in  part  to  Foucault’s  male  
centered understanding of both individual rights and of state power. A known feminist critique of 
Foucault’s   writings   on   state   power   and   on   the regulation of sexuality holds that Foucault 
completely ignores the unique position of women and the unique impact of the regulation of 
sexuality on them in his analyses. For example, Professor Sandra Bartky argues: 
Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily 
experiences of men and women did not differ and as if men and women bore the 
same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life. Where is the 
account   of   the   disciplinary   practices   that   engender   the   “docile   bodies”   of  
women, bodies more docile than the bodies of men? . . . To overlook the forms 
of subjection that engender the feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and 
powerlessness of those upon whom those disciplines have been imposed. 
Hence, even though a  liberatory  note  is  sounded  in  Foucault’s  critique  of  power,  
his analysis as a whole reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout 
Western political theory.18 
Bartky’s   critique   is   to   the   point,   but   it   uncovers   only   half   of   Foucault’s   oversight.  
Women’s unique position with respect to the regulation of sexuality works in two seemingly 
contradictory ways. On the one hand, as Bartky points out, it makes them more vulnerable to a 
violation of their bodily integrity and their basic rights through oppressive regulation. On the 
other hand, and at the same time, it also makes them more vulnerable to the absence of regulation. 
Thus, feminists have argued that the lack of state regulation and support for matters pertaining to 
women’s  unique  reproductive  functions and needs, such as those concerning pregnancy and child 
                                                                
15  On China, see Rachael Savanyu, The   Public   Womb:   Women   under   China’s   One-Child Policy, in 
International Watch, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 17-20 (2000-2001). On Romania, see Florin S. Soare, Ceausescu’s  
Population Policy: A Moral or an Economic Choice Between Compulsory and Voluntary Incentivised Motherhood?; 2 
EUR. J. GOV. & ECON., 59, 60 (2013). On Israel, see Gila Stopler, Israel’s  Natality  Policy  and  the  Rights  of  Women  and  
Minorities, 11 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 473 (2008) (Hebrew). On Japan, see Michiko Miyazaki, The History of Abortion-
Related Acts and Current Issues in Japan, 26 MED. & L. 791 (2007) (discussing the history of abortion law in Japan). On 
the United States, see Lisa Powell, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow Policies Designed to Discourage 
Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 484-85 (2002). See also infra Parts I-IV for a 
detailed discussion of policies in the United States and various countries. 
16  Paul Demeny, Population Policy in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULATION 752, 752-53 (Paul Demeny & 
Geoffrey McNicoll eds., 2003) 
17  Genesis 1:28. 
18  SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
OPPRESSION 65 (1990). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/3
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birth, prevent women from fully realizing their reproductive rights as well as their other liberal 
rights, and from obtaining reproductive justice.19 Unlike   men’s,   women’s   oppression   can   be  
deepened not  only  by   the   state’s  misuse of its biopower, but also by its disuse of its biopower. 
Foucault’s  and  Eisenhower’s  male-centric failure to acknowledge this fact can account for their 
insistence that any form of biopolitics is unsuitable for the liberal state. 
While the feminist position that I have just stated is quite common in most parts of the 
world, other feminists, and especially U.S. feminists, object to any government intervention in 
issues concerning fertility and reproduction, due to the tendency of states and communities to 
disregard   women’s   rights   when   engaging   in   biopolitics.   To   these   feminists   the   slogan  
“government,  stay  out  of  my  uterus”  has  become  a  rallying  cry.20 This Article will question both 
the feasibility of this rallying cry and the assumption that the full withdrawal of government from 
any and all fertility and reproduction issues is indeed in the best interests of women. While fully 
acknowledging  that  grave  violations  of  women’s  rights  may  occur  when  governments  engage  in  
biopolitics, and while agreeing that in some respects government should certainly stay out of 
women’s  uteruses,  this  Article  will  use  a  feminist  perspective  to  claim  that  women  should  insist  
that in other respects, and under certain conditions, governments must take full cognizance of 
their uteruses when crafting public policy, and that by not doing so governments are violating 
women’s   equal   rights.   This   position,  which   is  widely   shared   by   feminists   around   the   world,   is  
much less popular in the United States.21 American exceptionalism in this area can be attributed in 
large part to the choice-based legacy of Roe v. Wade and to the continuing feminist struggle to 
preserve its precarious gains.22 However, as Professor Robin West eloquently argues, Roe’s  
                                                                
19  See, e.g., Natasha Bhushan, Note, Work-Family Policy in the United States, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 677,  677,  683  (2012).  “Reproductive  justice”  as  referred  to  in  this  Article  is  the  full  realization  of  both  the  negative  
and the positive rights aspects of  women’s  reproductive  health.  A  commonly  used  definition  of  reproductive  justice  in  the  
United States, which comes from a founding organization in the American reproductive justice grassroots movement and 
which excellently captures this meaning, is the following:  
[T]he complete physical, mental, spiritual, political, economic, and social well-being of women and 
girls [that] will be achieved when women and girls have the economic, social and political power 
and resources to make healthy decisions about our bodies, sexuality and reproduction for ourselves, 
our families and our communities in all areas of our lives. 
ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 1 (2005), available at http://strongfamiliesmovement.org/ 
assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf. It is important to note that the grassroots reproductive justice movement in the 
United  States  is  critical  of  the  use  of  “rights  talk”  and  of  litigation  strategies to achieve reproductive justice in light of the 
skewed understanding of reproductive rights in the United States, which is based on a negative right to privacy. See 
Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions under Health Care Reform, 15 
CUNY L. REV. 391, 398-99  (2012).  While  this  Article  shares  the  American  reproductive  justice  movement’s  criticism  of  
the  current  skewed  understanding  of  reproductive  rights  in  American  law,  it  does  not  share  its  aversion  to  “rights  talk”  or  
to the use of courts to monitor government fertility policies. 
20  See, e.g., FORA.tvPolitics, Rep.  Tammy  Duckworth  Slams  GOP:  ‘Stay  Out  of  My  Uterus,’ HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jul. 28, 2013), http://videos.huffingtonpost.com/rep-tammy-duckworth-slams-gop-stay-out-of-my-uterus-
517871980. 
21  See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 
118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009) (discussing how the constitutional right to abortion legitimates a minimalist state response to 
women who opt to carry their pregnancies to term and to poor parents who in actuality require more support). 
22  Id. at 1398-1405; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973). 
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continuing vulnerability should not prevent feminists from openly critiquing its problematic 
choice-based legacy, and the way in which it has weakened the struggle for reproductive rights 
more broadly conceived in the United States.23 
Contrary to Foucault, I will claim that there are a host of economic, societal and feminist 
reasons why governments may take a deep interest in the size and growth of their populations, 
and that therefore governments do have a legitimate interest in engaging in biopolitics, fertility, 
and reproduction.24 Thus, the real question is not whether governments should take an interest in 
the size and growth of their population, but how can they do so without violating individual 
rights,   especially  women’s   rights.   I  will   further   claim   that   as   a   factual  matter all governments, 
including the U.S. government, necessarily engage in fertility policies, since there is no 
government that does not make an abundance of direct and indirect policy choices that affect 
fertility and reproduction.25 In this context, the Article will argue that nonintervention in fertility 
is as much a fertility policy as any interventionist fertility policy—and with similarly profound 
implications.26 
Consequently, the question we need to ask is not whether it is legitimate for a 
government to have any fertility policy, but what fertility policies are legitimate for governments 
to have? In an attempt to answer this question, the Article will identify three types of interests that 
fertility policies may serve: (1) legitimate state and group interests, (2) individual liberty interests, 
such as autonomy and privacy, and (3) individual equality interests. The Article will claim that 
while communities and states may have a legitimate interest in trying to influence fertility rates, 
this interest may only  be  realized  by  promoting  individual  women’s  liberty  and  equality  interests.  
Thus,  the  answer  to  Foucault’s  question,  “[i]n  the  name  of  what  and  according  to  what  rules  can  
[the  phenomenon  of  population]  be  managed?”27 is that population can and should be managed in 
the   name   of   women’s   liberty   and   equality   interests   and   according   to   rules   promoting   these  
interests. 
In Part I of the Article, I will ask whether states can(not) have fertility policies, and 
explore the interests that underlie such policies. I will begin by describing the liberal critique 
against any government intervention in reproduction and show how, following Roe, this critique 
has become the basis for American liberal feminist thinking on reproductive rights. I will then 
move on to discuss the perspective of the state, and flesh out the reasons why states and 
communities may have a legitimate interest in fertility policies. Then, building on Professor 
Frances  Olsen’s  argument  with  respect  to  the  myth  of  state  nonintervention  in  the  family, I will 
claim that it is theoretically incoherent and factually untrue to hold that states may be able to 
abstain from making any policy decisions with regard to fertility. If having fertility policies is 
both legitimate and inevitable, then the question that needs to be asked is not whether states can 
have fertility policies, but what sorts of fertility policies are legitimate for states to have, and what 
                                                                
23  West, supra note 21, at 1404. 
24  Demeny, supra note 16, at 753-54. At the international level, see Jason L. Finkle & C. Alison McIntosh, 
The New Politics of Population, 20 POPULATION & DEV. REV. (Supp. 1994) 3, 6-7 (1994). 
25  In   this   Article,   “fertility   policies”  will   refer   to   any   policy   that   directly   or   indirectly   affects   women’s  
ability  to  give  birth  to  children  and  to  parents’  ability  to raise them. 
26  This   argument   follows   Frances   Olsen’s   famous   argument   regarding   the   incoherence   of   arguing   that  
government can have a policy of nonintervention in the family. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the 
Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985). 
27  FOUCAULT, BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 14, at 317. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/3
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types of interests can underlie these policies. I will then discuss the feminist perspective on the 
types of policies that are legitimate, and indeed required, for a state to have. 
Finally, based on this discussion, I will suggest a test for assessing the legitimacy of 
fertility policies. I will identify three types of interests that fertility policies may serve: legitimate 
state and group interests, individual liberty interests, such as autonomy and privacy, and 
individual equality interests, and claim that the validity of a given fertility policy should be 
assessed by examining it against these interests. Two rules should guide this examination. First, 
similar   to  any  other  government  policy,   fertility  policies  can  only  be  based  on  a   state’s  need   to  
promote   legitimate   interests   (the   “legitimate   interests   prong”).   Second,   due   to   the   primacy   of  
individual rights, even legitimate state and group interests in fertility can only be realized while 
respecting  and  promoting  individual  rights,  especially  individual  women’s  rights,   to  both  liberty  
and   equality   (“liberty   and   equality   prong”).   Any   policy   should   satisfy both prongs of the test 
concurrently, in order to be considered legitimate. 
The reminder of the Article will be dedicated to a discussion of some of the fertility 
policies that exist throughout the world, including in the United States, and their evaluation 
according to the suggested test. In Part II, I will discuss pronatalist fertility policies and assess 
them according to the suggested two-pronged test. In particular I will discuss various restrictions 
on abortion, ideological propaganda aimed at encouraging women to have children, and support 
for families. In Part III, I will discuss antinatalist policies and their limits. I will also discuss in 
detail whether it is legitimate for a state to try to implement antinatalist fertility policies in 
traditional communities, where women are pressured into having an inordinately high number of 
children. Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss various eugenic fertility policies, in particular 
restrictions on interracial and interreligious marriages as eugenic fertility policies. 
I. CAN STATES (NOT) HAVE FERTILITY POLICIES? 
In   this   section,   I   will   flesh   out   the   various   arguments   for   and   against   states’   rights   to  
design fertility policies. I argue that states may, should, and in fact, do have policies that affect 
fertility, and suggest a test for assessing the legitimacy of these policies. 
A. The Liberal Approach 
Decisions concerning procreation and family planning are among the most intimate and 
meaningful life decisions that people make. Consequently, liberal theory holds that the state must 
stay out of such decisions.28 Liberal are highly suspicious of government and its motivations. This 
                                                                
28  Gila Stopler, A Feminist Perspective on Natality Policies in Multicultural Societies, 2 L. & ETHICS 
HUMAN RTS. 1, 5 (2008). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized liberty rights, which protect individuals from undue 
interference by the state, as including decisions related to: abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); marriage, 
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Eisenstadt v. 
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, at 453-54 (1972) (stating that the right of privacy includes the right of the individual to be free from 
governmental intervention into the decision to have children); and the raising and education of children, Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (reviewing previous cases where the Court has deemed a government action 
cannot infringe in the area of private family life); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding the state cannot force children to only attend public schools). This line of cases which 
anchors individual liberty rights in substantive due process is steeped in classical liberal thought. See Davin J. Hall, Not So 
Landmark after All? Lawrence v. Texas: Classical Liberalism and Due Process Jurisprudence, 13 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 617, 638 (2004) (discussing  how  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), builds 
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suspicion leads liberals to adhere to a sharp distinction between the public and the private 
sphere.29 While government is allowed to interfere in the public sphere, it must stay out of the 
private sphere of home and family, and even more so of intimate relations and procreation 
decisions.30 In these spheres the greatest possible freedom must be attained.31 In the famous words 
of Isaiah Berlin: 
[T]here are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be 
inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and widely 
accepted that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is 
to be a normal human being . . . .32 
Moreover, because autonomy is fundamental to liberal theory, liberals would reject any 
attempt by the state to take a stand as to the desired number of children per family or to take 
measures to carry this stand into effect, believing that such measures may obstruct the ability of 
individuals to freely choose the number of their children.33In the United States, this strong liberal 
stance against any government intervention in reproduction has served as the constitutional basis 
for the Supreme  Court’s  most  important  decision  on  reproductive  rights,  Roe v. Wade.34 The Roe 
court held that the right to privacy, which is founded on the Fourteenth Amendment concept of 
personal  liberty  and  on  restrictions  upon  state  action,  encompasses  a  woman’s  decision whether or 
not to terminate her pregnancy.35 Thus,  the  woman’s  right  to  choose  whether  or  not  to  carry  her  
pregnancy to term is an individualistic, negative right to privacy and personal liberty. As West 
points out, the right to abortion established by Roe prohibits the state from interfering in a 
woman’s  contractual  freedom  to  purchase  an  abortion,  but  it  does  nothing  to  ensure  that  a  woman  
who needs an abortion can actually have access to one or can afford to pay for it.36 Furthermore, 
even this negative individualistic right not to reproduce is limited. The Court rejected the claim 
that a woman has an absolute right to decide when and how to terminate her pregnancy, and held 
that the state can restrict that right through regulation protecting important state interests.37 
Moreover, Roe did not even explicitly create a legal right to abortion, but only created a right 
against the criminalization of abortion in some circumstances and left the abortion decision and its 
effectuation to the medical judgment of  the  pregnant  woman’s  physician,  and  not  to  the  woman  
herself.38 
                                                                
on the liberal theory of prior cases). 
29  Stopler, supra note 28. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 15, 28 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 
1984).  
33  Stopler, supra note 28, at 5-6. 
34  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
35  Id. at 153. 
36  West, supra note 21, at 1403. 
37  Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
38  West, supra note 21, at 1403; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66. 
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West argues that, notwithstanding all the limitations of the Roe decision  from  a  women’s  
rights perspective, there have been very few constructive critiques of Roe by feminist legal 
scholars.39 She attributes this mainly to Roe’s   continuing   vulnerability,   but   also   to   the   feminist  
belief  in  its  efficacy  and  to  the  feminist  feeling  that  “Roe got  so  much  exactly  right”  even  if  it  did  
not get everything right.40 However, while Roe may   have   “got[ten]   so   much   exactly   right”   in  
terms of protecting the right to abortion, Roe’s   individualistic,   negative,   choice-based 
understanding   of   women’s   reproductive   rights   has   been   detrimental   to   the   American   feminist  
understanding of the proper role of the state in   affirmatively   supporting  women’s   reproductive  
rights through appropriate fertility policies,41 which is further explored in Part I.C. 
B. State Interests and State Actions 
Every state and every society has a strong interest in fertility rates. Fertility rates can 
determine the future of the community—will it grow enough or too much, will it grow smaller or 
perhaps even disappear altogether? While, in the past, the size of the population was considered 
vital to ensuring national strength, economic growth, and protection from outside aggression,42 
these days the size of the population and its age composition are considered central to issues such 
as public spending on elderly care, pensions and health care, and the size of the workforce.43 All 
these issues represent legitimate and important interests which any government is permitted and 
indeed expected to care about and to plan for. The fact that these issues are directly affected by 
fertility rates makes fertility rates a subject that the government can legitimately be concerned 
with when working to advance such interests. 
It  is  important  to  stress  that  my  defense  of  the  government’s  right  to  concern  itself  with  
fertility rates is limited only to such instances in which the interests that the government is trying 
to promote through its fertility policies are themselves legitimate interests. Thus, if the 
government designs fertility policies in order to achieve clearly illegitimate interests, such as 
racial purity, these policies should be struck down.44 Furthermore, even state interests that are not 
facially illegitimate should be carefully scrutinized, and found legitimate only when they aim to 
achieve societal goals that are appropriate in a democratic society and are sensitive to the need to 
respect individual rights.45 Thus,  for  example,  a  societal  goal  of  tripling  a  country’s  fertility  rates  
                                                                
39  West, supra note 21, at 1398-1405.  
40  Id. at 1400-02. 
41  Id. at 1425 (arguing that Roe does not create a robust concept of reproductive justice, but instead, 
suggests that women have a right to nonreproductive sex). 
42  See Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3; Demeny, supra note 16, at 752.  
43  See Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OEDC], Policy Brief: Can Policies Boost Birth Rates?, 
at 1 (Nov. 2007); see also Comm’n  of  European  Communities,  Green  Paper  “Confronting  Demographic Change: A New 
Solidarity Between the Generations,” at 13 COM (2005) 94 final (Mar. 16, 2005). 
44  See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 
HASTINGS L.J. 711,  750  (1994)  (highlighting  “excluded  reasons”  that  cannot  serve  as  justification  for  government  action  
in a certain area of life). 
45  See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (previously titled 
“Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms”),  for  a  similar  examination  of  state  interests  
and the right to respect for private and family life. Article 8 states:  “Everyone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  
family life . . . .There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
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should  not  be  considered  a   legitimate  state   interest,  no  matter  how  dangerously   low  a  country’s  
fertility rate is. The reason is that such a goal, whose achievement would require women to triple 
the  number  of  their  children,  is  clearly  insensitive  to  women’s  individual  rights.  Thus,  my  claim  
that governments can design fertility policies to advance legitimate state interests does not mean 
that the government can decide on any fertility policy that advances these interests. I would, 
however, argue that it does mean that, despite liberal uneasiness about government intrusion into 
the private sphere of home and family, governments are justified in trying to craft fertility policies 
that may advance important and legitimate interests, as long as these policies are compatible with 
individual  rights,  and  especially  with  women’s  rights.  The  exact  contours  of  this  compatibility  are  
discussed in Part I.C below. 
Thus far, I have argued that governments may have general legitimate interests to create 
fertility policies. In addition, from a feminist perspective, governments have the right, and indeed 
the   duty,   to   design   fertility   policies   that   can   advance   women’s   rights   to   liberty   and   equality. 
Before turning to the feminist arguments with regard to fertility policies, I first claim that, as a 
factual matter, it is impossible for governments not to affect fertility, directly and indirectly, 
through their actions and inactions. Thus, my claim is  that  a  decision  such  as  Eisenhower’s—not 
to have any policy with regard to fertility—is as much a fertility policy as the decision to craft a 
positive   fertility   policy,   and   should   be   regarded   as   such.   This   argument   tracks  Olsen’s   famous  
argument with regard to the myth of state nonintervention in the family.46 According to Olsen, 
with  respect  to  state  involvement  in  the  family  the  terms  “intervention”  and  “nonintervention”  are  
indeterminate and largely meaningless.47 They imply that the state can choose either to remain 
neutral or uninvolved in the family (nonintervention), or to take a stand and get involved in the 
family (intervention).48 Olsen argues that this way of presenting state involvement in the family is 
ideologically driven and analytically mistaken.49 A state cannot stay neutral or remain uninvolved, 
since  “[a]s  long  as  a  state  exists  and  enforces  any  laws  at  all,  it  makes  political  choices.”50 Thus, 
the state already intervenes in the family by the very fact that it decides which groupings to 
recognize as families and which not, and what rights and duties each member of the family may 
have towards the other.51 
A similar argument can be made with respect to fertility. Although the biological fact of 
giving birth may occur irrespective of the state, almost all other aspects of fertility—from the 
legal recognition of motherhood through contraception, abortion, and fertility treatment, to 
maternity leave and child care—are regulated by state laws.52 Furthermore, the biological fact of 
giving birth is itself influenced by government policies on all the above-mentioned issues. Thus, 
for   example,   the   government’s   refusal   to   apply   anti-discrimination in employment laws to 
pregnant   women,   or   to   mandate   paid   maternity   leave,   restricts   working   women’s   options   for 
                                                                
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added). 
46  See Olsen, supra note 26. 
47  Id. at 835. 
48  Id. at 835-37 
49  Id. at 863. 
50  Id. at 836. 
51  See id. at 837, 842. 
52  See generally Ryiah Lilith, The G.I.F.T of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 207 (2001) (discussing the legal recognition of motherhood). 
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childbearing.53 Similarly, restrictions on abortion and on the allocation of federal funds to sex 
education programs other than abstinence-only  programs,   restricts  women’s  and  girls’  ability   to  
prevent or end an unwanted pregnancy.54 Thus, government cannot, and in fact does not, remain 
neutral with regard to fertility. Any decision that the government makes, or that it refuses to 
make,  has  a  clear  impact  on  fertility,  both  in  terms  of  the  individual  woman’s  ability  to  exercise  
her reproductive rights and in terms of aggregate fertility rates. 
Arguably, even if government actions and inactions affect fertility whether government 
intends for this to happen or not, one could still claim a distinction between intentionally trying to 
influence fertility rates and doing so unintentionally. As the argument would go, from the 
perspective of respecting privacy and autonomy, what is morally wrong, and should therefore be 
prohibited, is the intention to affect fertility rates, not the actual effect. 
However, I would argue that the distinction between acting with intent to affect fertility 
rates and acting without such intent is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it would seem rather 
naïve to assume that governments are unaware of the effects on fertility rates of most of the 
policies they enact. It is very easy for a government that wishes to influence fertility rates to do so 
without revealing its intent. Thus, ruling out only intentional fertility policies does not in fact 
prevent their existence. For example, Professor Patricia Hill Collins shows how U.S. fertility 
policies   (which   she   terms   “population   policies”),   although   allegedly   non-existent, and not 
intended to influence fertility rates, are in fact very much in existence and are designed to result in 
differentiated fertility rates according to different racial and social classes.55 She argues that a 
complex array of state policies governing taxation, insurance, employment conditions and health 
care   regulation   encourage  middle   class   white   women’s   fertility,   while   other policies, including 
welfare policies that encourage permanent or reversible sterilization, aim to decrease the fertility 
rates of working-class and poor African-American women.56 The second reason why I find the 
distinction between acting with intent to affect fertility rates and acting without such intent 
unpersuasive   is   that,   as   Collins’s   example   clearly   shows,   not   only   does   ruling   out   intentional  
fertility policies not prevent their existence, but it makes it easier for such policies to exist 
undetected and un-scrutinized. The existence of clear, intentional and transparent fertility policies 
would make it easier for those influenced by them to identify, scrutinize, and criticize fertility 
policies. 
If the arguments above are correct, then the question that needs to be asked is not 
whether states should have fertility policies, but what kind of fertility policies should states have? 
This brings me to the feminist argument regarding the desired design of government fertility 
policies to which I now turn. 
                                                                
53  See Bhushan, supra note 19; Jessica Monroe, Ohio’s  “Pregnancy-blind”  Leave  Policy:  The  Public  Policy  
Ramifications of McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 229 (2011). 
54  See, e.g., Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State Policy 
Review, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Mar. 
28, 2015). 
55  Patricia Hill Collins, Producing the Mothers of the Nations: Race, Class and Contemporary US 
Population Policies, in WOMEN, CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENCE 118 (Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werbner eds., 1999). 
56  Id. at 120-26. 
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C. The Feminist Approach 
Unlike liberals, whose individualistic conception of autonomy and suspicion of 
government lead them to adhere to a strict separation between the public and the private spheres, 
most strands of feminist theory evaluate the desirability of fertility policies from quite a different 
perspective.57 For feminists, the separation between the public and the private spheres is central to 
women’s   oppression   and   subordination.58 Feminists argue that patriarchal societies confine 
women to the private sphere, where they are expected to take unremunerated care of the family 
and the children, as part of their duties of love.59 Unlike the public sphere where principles of 
justice and the rights discourse prevail, the family is often perceived to be beyond justice.60 
Professor Michael Sandel warns that applying the principles of justice within the family will 
result  in  the  loss  of  “nobler  virtues,”61 such as affection, self-sacrifice, and generosity. 
These  views  of  women’s  place  in  the  family  and  the  practices that they legitimate serve 
as  the  practical,  as  well  as  the  normative,  basis  for  women’s  oppression.  Societies  and  states  need  
children in order to ensure their continuation and use women, without remuneration, in order to 
give birth to children and to raise them.62 This releases men, as well as the state, from the 
demanding duties of care involved in the rearing of children, and the public-private divide 
conceals this unjust exploitation.63 Other means through which this concealment is achieved are 
the ideology of motherhood and the myth of love.64 These   portray   motherhood   as   a   woman’s  
vocation  and  convey  a  powerful  message  that  a  mother’s  love  requires  that  a  woman  sacrifice  all  
her wants and needs for the benefit of her family and children.65 Furthermore,   women’s   equal  
rights in the polity are sometimes seen as stemming from and predicated on their fulfillment of 
their roles as mothers.66 
The exploitation of women for childbearing and rearing occurs both in traditional and 
                                                                
57  On the individualistic nature of the traditional conception of autonomy, see Catriona Mackenzie & 
Natalie Stoljar, Introduction to RELATIONAL AUTONOMY FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE 
SOCIAL SELF 3, 5-6 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). 
58  Stopler, supra note 28,  at  6.  While  there  are  multiple  feminist  approaches  and  their  analyses  of  women’s  
subordination   vary,   I   use   “feminist   theory”   in   the   singular   to   indicate   the   basic   agreement   that   exists   between   these  
approaches with regard to the claims that I discuss. 
59  Dana Freibach-Heifetz & Gila Stopler, On Conceptual Dichotomies and Social Oppression, 34 PHIL. & 
SOC. CRITICISM 515, 520-21 (2008). 
60  See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 25-40 (1989). 
61  MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 34 (2d ed. 1998). 
62  Stopler, supra note 28, at 6. 
63  Stopler, supra note 28, at 6; Freibach-Heifetz & Stopler, supra note 59, at 520. 
64  Stopler, supra note 28, at 6. 
65  Id.; see Freibach-Heifetz & Stopler, supra note 59, at 520; see generally Gila Stopler, Gender 
Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 43 (2005); see also Nitza Berkovitch, 
Motherhood as a National Mission, 20 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 605, 605-10 (1997) (discussing the construction of 
womanhood in Israel); JACQUELINE PORTUGESE, FERTILITY POLICY IN ISRAEL: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION, GENDER, AND 
NATION 2 (1998). 
66  E.g., Berkovitch, supra note 65, at 615. 
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religious communities, as well as in liberal capitalist societies.67 The structure of the liberal 
capitalist  state  is  “predicated  on  leaving  the  duty  to  care  for  children  in  the  hands  of  the  family,  
i.e., with the mother, and on freeing the state, society, the market, and men from any obligations 
in  this  respect.”68 The ideology of choice that has been the basis for the Roe decision serves the 
liberal   capitalist   structure   as   an   important   justification   for  women’s   exclusive   responsibility   for  
their children. As West argues, since Roe gives women the right to choose to enter into a 
contractual obligation to perform an abortion, a woman who chooses to forgo the opportunity to 
abort and decides to give birth and to parent the child is seen as making her own private choice, 
which there is no reason to publicly subsidize, no matter how costly it is.69 The liberal portrayal of 
childbearing and rearing as an activity which the state does not have and cannot have any interest 
in, further strengthens the argument that the state has no responsibility to assist with it. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, all governments have an interest in the number of children born in 
their countries, but liberal capitalist governments are satisfied to leave the task of persuading 
people to bear children to religious communities while leaving the duties of care to the parents, 
and especially to mothers.70 
How does all this affect the feminist perspective on fertility policies? Theoretically, 
feminist  awareness  of   the  ways   in  which   states  and  communities  exploit  women’s   reproductive 
roles  might  result  in  their  adamant  rejection  of  states’  right  to  set  and  implement  fertility  policies.  
Another reason for feminists to reject state involvement in matters of reproduction is the value 
that feminists place on choice and autonomy. Although most feminists perceive autonomy as a 
positive relational right, while liberals understand it as a negative individualistic one, both 
feminists and liberals posit that free choice is fundamentally important, and are concerned that 
women might be coerced into having children by their states or communities.71 Consequently, all 
strands within feminist theory seem to agree that the lack of reproductive choice is a central 
means for the oppression of women.72 Thus,  just  as  the  rallying  cry  “government,  stay  out of my 
uterus”   suggests,   a   complete  withdrawal   of   the   state   from   any   and   all   reproduction   issues  may  
seem  the  most  conducive  to  the  protection  of  women’s  rights. 
Nevertheless, as I have already argued, a complete withdrawal of the state from all 
reproduction issues is not possible. There are two interrelated reasons why feminists should 
support some forms of fertility policies—and should even regard them as indispensable to 
equality for women.73 The first reason is that feminists, above all others, understand that in order 
to  achieve  equality  for  women,  “the  perception  that  raising  children   is  a  woman’s  job,  to  which  
                                                                
67  Stopler, supra note 28, at 6-7. See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals 
Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices That Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154 (2003), for 
a  discussion  of  a  woman’s  role  in  traditional  and  religious  societies. 
68  Stopler, supra note 28, at 7; see Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, supra 
note 65, at 70; OKIN, supra note 60.  
69  See West, supra note 21, at 1410-11. 
70  Freibach-Heifetz & Stopler, supra note 59, at 519-20. 
71  Stopler, supra note 28, at 7. On the differences between the feminist and the liberal conceptions of 
autonomy, see Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 57, at 5. 
72  Stopler, supra note 28, at 7; PORTUGESE, supra note 65, at 1.  
73  The discussion of these two reasons, which follows, is adapted from Stopler, supra note 28, at 7-8. 
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she  must  dedicate  herself  with  no  remuneration  and  no  help,  must  fundamentally  change.”74 There 
should be recognition of the fact that raising children is the duty of both parents and that they 
must share the care duties that this important task involves.75 If parenting is shared by both 
parents, and the constraints that arise from the care duties towards children affect both men and 
women, then the labor market would have to adapt to these constraints by implementing parent-
friendly policies—such as flexible working hours.76 The state would facilitate and enforce this 
adaptation through protective legislation.77 Furthermore, the state would be obliged to support 
parents’  efforts  to  combine  their  care  duties  with  participation  in  the  job  market  by  supplying  low-
cost, high-quality day care and tax-deductible care services.78 
The second reason why feminists should support fertility policies despite their 
intervention in the private sphere is that much of the oppression of women by individuals and 
communities occurs in this sphere.79 Liberals prefer to turn a blind eye to the fact that in some 
communities, women are expected to give birth to a large number of children without having any 
meaningful choice in the matter.80 While according to liberal myth, by staying clear of the private 
sphere,  “the  state  allows  everyone  the  freedom  to  choose  and  to  act  out  of  their  own  free  will,”  the  
reality is that by staying  clear  of  the  private  sphere  “the  state  facilitates  the  continued  existence  of  
private  power  over  women’s  bodies  and  procreative  abilities.”81 Thus, as will be discussed below, 
feminists may, under certain conditions, support fertility policies that are aimed at reducing 
fertility rates in religious communities that pressure women into having an inordinately high 
number of children.82 
Even in the United States, where the individualistic, negative rights, choice-based, Roe-
inspired understanding of reproductive rights prevails, some feminist legal scholars, such as 
Professor Reva Siegel, have for years been advocating a positive rights, equality-based analysis of 
reproductive rights.83 These scholars have even been supporting government regulation of 
reproduction that is compatible with the Equal Protection Clause and with the guarantee of equal 
sexual freedom.84 A detailed list of positive reproductive rights that should be protected through 
expansive fertility policies is provided by West, who posits that: 
                                                                
74  Stopler, supra note 28, at 7. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 7-8. 
77  Id. at 8. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Stopler, supra note 28, at 8. 
81  Id. 
82  See infra Part III.B. 
83  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and 
Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 842 (2007). 
84  For examples of such writings supporting the equality analysis, see Symposium, Sex Equality Arguments 
for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007); Lilith, 
supra note 52. See generally PORTUGESE, supra note 65. 
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Reproductive justice requires a state that provides a network of support for the 
processes of reproduction: protection against rape and access to affordable and 
effective birth control, healthcare, including but not limited to abortion services, 
prenatal care, support in childbirth and postpartum, support for breastfeeding 
mothers, early childcare for infants and toddlers, income support for parents 
who stay home to care for young babies, and high quality public education for 
school age children.85 
Clear support   for   the   setting  of   fertility  policies   that  advance  both  women’s   rights  and  
the legitimate interests of states can be found on the international level. International law 
recognized that states have the right to establish population and fertility policies. The United 
Nations International Conference on Population and Development held in 1994 in Cairo adopted a 
feminist position,86 and   its   Programme   of   Action   (“Cairo   Plan   of   Action”)   states   that   the  
empowerment of women and gender equality are cornerstones of policies related to development 
and population.87 Thus, according to the Cairo Plan of Action, states have both the right and the 
duty  “to  implement  population  policies  that  strive  to  ensure  women’s  full  and  equal  participation  
in both public and private life, their full equality in education, in economic life, in employment, in 
decision making and in household responsibilities, and their full access to and autonomy with 
respect  to  reproductive  health.”88 
D. How to Assess the Legitimacy of Fertility Policies 
The above discussion has identified three types of interests that fertility policies may 
serve: legitimate state and group interests, individual liberty interests, such as autonomy and 
privacy, and individual equality interests. On the basis of the above discussion, I claim that the 
legitimacy of a given fertility policy should be assessed by examining it against these interests, 
and that two rules should guide this examination. First, similar to any other government policy, 
fertility policies can only be based   on   a   state’s   need   to   promote   legitimate   interests   (the  
“legitimate   interests   prong”).  As   will   be   further   discussed   below,   this   rule   leads  me   to   oppose  
both fertility policies that are aimed at promoting clearly illegitimate interests, and fertility 
policies that promote interests that may upon first glance seem facially legitimate, but a closer 
examination would reveal that they cannot be deemed legitimate in a democratic society that 
respects human rights.89 This would lead me to reject fertility policies such as the Chinese one-
                                                                
85  West, supra note 21, at 1425. 
86  See Int’l  Conference  on  Population  &  Dev.,  Cairo,  Egypt,  Sept.  5-13, 1994, Report of the International 
Conference on Population and Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 [hereinafter ICPD REPORT]; Programme 
of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, in ICPD REPORT, 1-115 [hereinafter Cairo Plan 
of Action]. 
87  Cairo Plan of Action, supra note 86, at 12 (Principle 4). 
88  Stopler, supra note 28, at 8; see Cairo Plan of Action, supra note 86, at 22, 40. 
89  See Pildes, supra note 44, at 750 (explaining exclusionary reasons which governments can never use as 
justification for limiting individual rights). For examples or interests that cannot be deemed legitimate in a democratic 
society that respects human rights, see European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 
(stating  that  “[e]veryone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  family  life”  and  that  “[t]here shall be no interference by 
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society”  (emphasis  added)). 
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child policy90 as well as various restrictions on abortion.91 Second, due to the primacy of 
individual rights, even legitimate state and group interests in fertility can only be realized while 
respecting and promoting individual rights,   especially   individual   women’s   liberty   and   equality  
rights   (the   “liberty   and   equality   prong”).   Since,   as   I   have   shown,   fertility   policies   focused   on  
nonintervention   and   motivated   solely   by   liberty   concerns   are   insufficient   to   ensure   women’s  
rights, any   fertility   policy   should   simultaneously   protect   both   women’s   liberty   interests   and  
women’s  equality   interests.  Furthermore,  any  policy   should  satisfy  both  prongs  of   the   test—the 
legitimate interest prong and the liberty and equality prong—concurrently, in order to be 
considered a legitimate fertility policy. 
The test just described is mainly motivated by feminist concerns. However, feminist 
theory, as a humanist theory that is acutely aware of the need to secure equal rights not only for 
women but also for other oppressed minorities, is highly sensitive to the fact that by shaping 
fertility policies according to ethnic, racial, religious, or class parameters, states and communities 
can ensure not only the continued control of men over women, but also the continued control of 
other dominant groups over minority groups.92 A liberal might argue that this problem should 
persuade us to adopt the liberal stance shunning state involvement in fertility, as the cost of such 
involvement exceeds its benefit. Nevertheless, because of the clear need for fertility policies in 
order  to  ensure  women’s  liberty  and  equality  rights,  discussed  above,  feminists  would  reject  this  
position  and  posit  that  the  proper  solution  for  the  need  to  prevent  abuse  of  government’s  power  to  
set fertility policies is for courts to apply close scrutiny to government fertility policies, and 
especially those that seem to differentiate between groups on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity, 
and the like. Such careful scrutiny can expose the illegitimate motivations behind fertility policies 
where they are present, and may result in their invalidation. 
In the reminder of the Article, I will describe various fertility policies that exist in 
different parts of the world and assess their compatibility with the suggested test. I will begin by 
describing pronatalist fertility policies, aimed at increasing fertility rates, move on to discussing 
antinatalist fertility policies, aimed at decreasing fertility rates, and end with a discussion of 
eugenic fertility policies. 
II. PRONATALIST FERTILITY POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS 
A. The Rationale for Pronatalist Fertility Policies93 
Throughout history, large populations were considered necessary to ensure national 
strength and economic growth.94 Consequently,   states’   fertility policies were pronatalistic. 
Religious ideologies—such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism—which believed procreation to be 
a sacred duty, as well as ethnic and nationalistic ideologies, also encouraged procreation. Thus, 
for example, contraception and abortion are opposed by the Catholic Vatican because of the 
                                                                
90  For history  and  analysis  of  China’s  one-child policy, see Xizhe Peng, Population Policy and Program in 
China: Challenge and Prospective, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 51 (2000); infra Part IV. 
91  For examples of restrictions on abortion, see Nash et al., supra note 54; infra Part III.  
92  PORTUGESE, supra note 65, at 2; see infra Part IV.A. 
93  This Subpart relies primarily on arguments put forth in Gila Stopler, Women as Bearers of the Nation: 
Between Liberal and Ethnic Citizenship, in DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND WAR, 164, 168 (Yoav Peled et al. eds., 2011). 
94  Stopler, supra note 93; Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3; Demeny, supra note 16, at 752. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/3
STOPLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/7/2015  10:34 AM 
2015] BIOPOLITICS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 185 
sanctity of procreation.95 Islam encourages procreation as well as early motherhood and sees 
women’s   role   as   bringing   children   into   the   world.96 Traditional Judaism restricts the use of 
contraception and abortion and holds that the duty to procreate is of the highest order.97 
In times of ethnic and national conflicts, ethnic and national communities measure 
women’s   contribution   to   the   community   through   their   ability   to   reproduce   the  members   of   the 
struggling community.98 What   makes   women’s   reproductive   role   so   important   is   that   “the  
‘common  origin’  of  the  community  members,  whether  true  or  imagined,  is  the  central  criterion  for  
belonging.”99 Lastly, in recent years, the shrinking of the population in many countries in Europe 
and its changing age composition have triggered more modern concerns such as public spending 
on elderly care, pensions and health care, and the size of the workforce.100 Consequently, the 
European  Commission’s  Green  Paper  on  the  demographic change transforming Europe posits that 
influencing  women’s  fertility  and  control  over  immigration  are  the  central  means  states  have  for  
influencing their demographic compositions.101 For national, ethnic, and religious communities, 
control over women’s   fertility   is   even  more   important,   since   these   communities   do   not   usually  
have control over immigration into the state in which they reside.102 
If raising fertility rates can be so important to states and communities, the question that 
needs to be examined is which pronatalist fertility policies can be considered legitimate and which 
cannot. Pronatalist fertility policies can range from restrictive, punitive measures such as criminal 
                                                                
95  Stopler, supra note 93; see Charles B. Keely, Limits to Papal Power: Vatican Inaction after Humanae 
Vitae, in THE NEW POLITICS OF POPULATION: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN FAMILY PLANNING 220, 222 (Jason L. Finkle 
& C. Alison McIntosh, eds., 1994). 
96  Stopler, supra note 93; see Ali A. Mazrui, Islamic Doctrine and the Politics of Induced Fertility Change: 
An African Perspective, in THE NEW POLITICS OF POPULATION: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN FAMILY PLANNING 121, 
121-22 (Jason L. Finkle & C Alison McIntosh, eds., 1994). 
97  Stopler, supra note 93; see PORTUGESE, supra note 65, at 46-47. 
98  Stopler, supra note 93; see Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis, Introduction to WOMAN—NATION—
STATE, 1, 6-10 (Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, eds., 1989). According to Yuval-Davis and Anthias, women 
participate in ethnic and national processes in five major ways:  
(a) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;  
(b) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic [or] national groups;  
(c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of 
its culture;  
(d) as signifiers of ethnic [or] national differences—as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses 
used in construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic [or] national categories;  
(e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles. 
Id. at 7. For historical examples of the effects of nationalism and ethnic conflict on state reproductive policies, see Patrizia 
Albanese, Abortion & Reproductive Rights under Nationalist Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe, WOMEN’S HEALTH & 
URB. LIFE, May 1, 2004, at 8.  
99  Stopler, supra note 93 (citing NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GENDER & NATION 26-27 (1997)). 
100  See OECD, supra note 43, at 1; see also Comm’n  of  European  Communities, supra note 43. 
101  Comm’n  of  European  Communities, supra note 43, at 5-6; Stopler, supra note 93.  
102  For a discussion of modern Protestant pronatalism in the United States, see John McKeown, Receptions 
of Israelite Nation-building: Modern Protestant Natalism and Martin Luther, 49 DIALOG 133 (2010). 
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prohibitions on abortion and on the use of contraception, to supportive measures such as free high 
quality day cares and flexible job markets.103 In what follows, I will discuss several examples of 
pronatalist fertility policies adopted in different countries, including various restrictions on 
abortion, ideological pronatalist propaganda, and supportive measures aimed at alleviating the 
burdens of childbearing and rearing. I will examine these policies against the suggested test for 
evaluating the legitimacy of fertility policies. 
B. Restrictions on Abortion 
There is a range of restrictions that governments can set on abortion.104 In this Article, I 
will focus on a few examples ranging from total prohibitions on abortion, through the 
requirements of state authorization for abortion and pre-abortion counseling, to the refusal to fund 
abortion. While this is merely a partial list of the many possible restrictions, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate the way in which the analysis of such restrictions should be made using the test 
suggested in this Article. 
1. Bans on Abortion 
Throughout most parts of the twentieth century, a nearly complete ban on abortion 
existed in many countries around the world with different ideological leanings, including, for 
example, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Romania, Japan and the United States.105 If we 
examine these strict bans on abortion according to the two-pronged test suggested here, such bans 
fail both the legitimate interest prong and the liberty and equality prong. While the interest of 
increasing   a   state’s   population   cannot  be   considered   illegitimate in and of itself, the interest of 
increasing   a   state’s   population   as   quickly   as   possible   and   without   regard   to   the   rights   of  
individuals involved, which has motivated at least some of the countries mentioned, cannot be 
considered a legitimate interest in a democratic society that is sensitive to individual rights. Of 
course, many of the countries mentioned here were not democratic countries that respected human 
rights at the time they pursued these policies, and this may be one reason they adopted such 
policies. However, this should not exempt fertility policies in these countries from being assessed 
from  a  human  rights  perspective  and  found  wanting.  Thus,  In  Nicolae  Ceauşescu’s  Romania,  the  
“need   to   obtain   quick   results   with   a   minimal   economic   cost”   in   the effort to increase the 
population is what motivated the regime to opt for a strict ban on abortion and for limitation and 
marginalization of contraception and of sexual education, instead of choosing to increase fertility 
                                                                
103  For examples of supportive measures that will be further discussed below, see Comm’n  of  European  
Communities, supra note 43 (describing the measures taken to promote natality in the European Union).  
104  For a range of recent restrictions various state governments in the United States are placing on abortion, 
see Nash et al., supra note 54. See also Katie McDonough, The 5 Most Dangerous Abortion Restrictions of 2013, SALON 
(Dec. 19, 2013, 7:44 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/19/the_5_most_dangerous_abortion_restrictions_of_2013. 
105  On the Soviet Union, France, and Germany, see David L. Hoffmann, Mothers in the Motherland: 
Stalinist Pronatalism in Its Pan-European Context, 34 J. SOCIAL HIST. 35, 38-40 (2000). On Romania, see Soare, supra 
note 15. On Japan, see Miyazaki, supra note 15, at 794-95. On the United States, see Christopher Z. Mooney & Mei-Hsien 
Lee, Legislating Morality in the American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
599, 602-03 (1995). For a history of perspectives on abortion in the United States, see Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the 
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992). 
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rates through economic incentives, as was suggested by some.106 When a state defines its interest 
in a manner that completely disregards its adverse effects on human rights, that interest cannot be 
considered legitimate. 
Another central interest motivating bans on abortion, which at first glance appears 
legitimate, is the interest in protecting the life of the fetus. However, a closer look at this interest 
reveals that its legitimacy is questionable. First, as a matter of law, fetuses were not recognized as 
persons except for very specific circumstances.107 Second, and more importantly, as Professor 
Judith Jarvis Thomson shows in her classical defense of abortion, even if we assume that the fetus 
is a person and has a right to life from the moment of conception, which it cannot realize without 
the help of its mother, it does not follow that the woman has an obligation to sacrifice nine 
months of her life in order to help the fetus realize this right.108 In fact, in no other context, except 
pregnancy, are people considered as having a legal obligation to sacrifice anything in order to 
help others realize their right to life.109 This is a clear indication that such demands—that women 
sacrifice their privacy, autonomy, bodily integrity and health for the sake of the fetus—are 
motivated first and foremost  by  stereotypical  perceptions  of  women’s  roles  and  their  obligations  
of love and sacrifice, and much less by a genuine and general concern in law and morality for the 
right to life.110 Consequently, the interest of a state in the right to life of the fetus, if 
unaccompanied by a similarly deep interest in the right to life in other contexts, is an interest 
motivated by biases and stereotypical views of women and is therefore illegitimate. 
Even if fertility policies banning abortion could survive the legitimate interest prong of 
the test suggested here, the policies would fail the liberty and equality prong. Prohibiting abortion 
violates   women’s   rights   to   privacy   and   autonomy   over   their   own   bodies   and   over   their   most  
important life decisions. At the same time,  a  ban  on  abortion  violates  women’s  right  to  equality  
since it imposes gender-differentiated burdens on women, which are not imposed on men. Forcing 
women to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to a child whom they do not want deprives 
them of dignity, health, happiness, and freedom in a manner in which men are not deprived.111 As 
Siegel explains: 
Control over whether and when to give birth is practically important to women 
for reasons inflected with gender-justice  concern:   It   crucially  affects  women’s  
health and sexual freedom, their ability to enter and end relationships, their 
education and job training, their ability to provide for their families, and their 
ability to negotiate work-family conflicts in institutions organized on the basis 
of traditional sex-role assumptions that this society no longer believes fair to 
enforce, yet is unwilling institutionally to redress.112 
                                                                
106  Soare, supra note 15, at 75-76. 
107  Dawn E. Johnsen, The   Creation   of   Fetal   Rights:   Conflicts   with   Women’s   Constitutional   Rights   to  
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600-04 (1986). 
108  Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 57-59, 64-65 (1971). 
109  Id. at 63. 
110  See Siegel, supra note 83, at 817. 
111  See id. at 817-19. 
112  Id. at 819. 
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2. State Authorization of Abortion and Pre-Abortion Counseling 
Somewhat less restrictive ways to decrease the number of abortions are to take the 
control over the decision to abort out of the hands of the woman, as is done in Israel, or to subject 
her to requirements that would weaken her resolve to abort, as is done in Germany. 
i. Israel 
From early on, the state of Israel has been concerned with the need to increase fertility 
rates in order to ensure the survival of the Jewish people. This concern has led the government to 
establish   a  Center   of  Demography  and   to   entrust   it  with   carrying  out   the  government’s   fertility  
policies.113 The government’s  policy  on  abortion  was  influenced  by  a  report  (the  “Beky  Report”)  
of a special Commission for Natality Problems that was appointed by the government.114 
Although at the time Israeli law criminalized all abortion, it was not being enforced and illegal 
abortions were being carried out freely.115 The commission, which concluded that abortion 
constituted a serious demographic concern, recommended the enactment of a new law that would 
criminalize all abortions unless they were approved by a special committee, and would be strictly 
enforced.116 The committee would only approve a minimal number of abortions, and approval 
would  be  granted  “only  after  an  attempt  was  made  to  persuade  the  woman  to  carry  the  pregnancy  
to   term.”117 Subsequently, Israeli law was amended in 1977 to allow only abortions that are 
approved by special pregnancy termination committees, which are authorized to permit the 
abortion only if certain conditions stipulated in the law are met, such as that the pregnancy 
constitutes a risk to the mother or that it was conceived out of wedlock.118 After the law was 
amended, the Center of Demography, together with the Health Ministry, initiated a policy 
stipulating that before filling a request to a pregnancy termination committee for an authorization 
of abortion, a woman is required to attend mandatory counseling with a social worker whose job 
                                                                
113  Government Decision Number 428, 9.4.67 (1967) (Hebrew). The decision includes, among other things, 
the  following  “[s]uggestions  regarding  the  demographic  policy”:   
The Government recognizes the need to act systematically in order to implement a demographic 
policy targeted at creating an atmosphere that will encourage natality, considering its importance to 
the future of the Jewish people. . . . For that purpose: [] Constant advertising campaigns will be 
held, efforts will be made to curb economic and social barriers will be removed and incentives will 
be  given,   in   the   fields  of  education,  housing,   insurance  and  so  on,  within   the  scope  of   the  state’s  
ability, in order to encourage families to increase their number of children. [] efforts will be made to 
curb artificial abortions will be curbed as their high rate is cause for concern, in both national-
demographic  terms,  and  in  terms  of  women’s  health. 
Id. 
114  The Report of the Commission for Natality Problems, Jerusalem, 1966 [hereinafter Beky Report] (Isr.) 
(Hebrew) (on file with author). 
115  Stopler, supra note 93, at 169; see Criminal Code Ordinance: An Ordinance to Provide a General Penal 
Code for Palestine (1936), 16 Geo. 6, c. 17, § 175 (Eng.). 
116  Stopler, supra note 93, at 169 (citing Beky Report, supra note 114, at 19-20, 44). 
117  Id. (citing Beky Report, supra note 114, at 44). 
118  Penal Law, 5737-1977, 31 LSI 84, §§ 312-21 (1976-1978) (Isr.); An Act Amending the Penal Laws 
(Termination of Pregnancy), 1977, SH No. 842 (Isr.). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol18/iss2/3
STOPLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 4/7/2015  10:34 AM 
2015] BIOPOLITICS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 189 
it is to try to persuade her to forgo the request and carry the pregnancy to term.119 This policy is 
still in force today.120 
If we examine the Israeli abortion policy according to the test suggested in this Article, it 
seems to fail both the legitimate interest prong and the liberty and equality prong. Israeli 
government   decisions   regarding   Israel’s   demographic   policy   plainly   state   that   Israel’s   fertility  
policies are motivated  by  the  government’s  concern  with  Jewish  population  growth.121 While it is 
legitimate for a particular ethnic or religious group to be interested only in its own growth, and 
not in the growth of other groups, it is highly questionable whether such an interest is legitimate 
for a state, which should be neutral towards all its citizens and equally interested in the welfare of 
                                                                
119  MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CIRCULAR 43/88, PREGNANCY TERMINATION COMMITTEES (1988) (Isr.) 
(Hebrew); MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CIRCULAR 64/90, INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INFORMATION PROVIDED TO WOMEN 
APPLYING TO PREGNANCY TERMINATION COMMITTEES AND COMMITTEE PROCEDURES, § 2(b) (1990) (Isr.) (Hebrew); 
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CIRCULAR 23/93, EXECUTION OF THE LAW AND REGULATIONS BY THE PREGNANCY TERMINATION 
COMMITTEES (1993) (Isr.) (Hebrew), available at http://www.health.gov.il/hozer/mk23_1993.pdf; Planned Termination of 
Pregnancy (Abortion), ISRAEL MINISTRY OF HEALTH, http://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/Pregnancy/Abortion/ 
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
120  See Planned Termination of Pregnancy (Abortion), ISRAEL MINISTRY OF HEALTH, 
http://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/Pregnancy/Abortion/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).  
The importance of the meeting with the social worker stems from the fact that if the woman files a 
request and meets the criteria stipulated by law for allowing abortions, such as that the pregnancy is 
out  of  wedlock,  the  committee  will  most  likely  approve  the  abortion.  The  social  worker’s  job  is  to  
both to alert women to the fact that they do not meet the criteria and should therefore not file a 
request, and even more importantly to persuade those women that do meet the criteria not to file the 
request and to carry the pregnancy to term. It should be noted that the committee does not require a 
woman who claims that the pregnancy is out of wedlock to prove her claim and thus potentially, 
almost any woman can obtain an abortion by stating that the pregnancy is out of wedlock. 
Stopler, supra note 93, at 177 n.14. 
121  In addition to the 1967 decision quoted in note 113 above and the Beky Report, supra note 114, the 
Israeli government made another decision regarding its demographic policy in 1986, which reads as follows: 
1596. The demographic trends among the Jewish people Decision: 
a. The government is concerned by the demographic trends in Israel and the Diaspora and is 
particularly worried about the slow-down of population growth in Israel, the decreasing Aliyah, and 
the rate of emigration as well as by the increase in assimilation and in mixed marriages in the 
Diaspora.  
b. The government decides to establish a comprehensive, coordinated, long-term demographic 
policy, that will strive inter alia to achieve a proper level of Jewish population growth and in order 
to achieve this goal it encourages cooperation with organizations representing the Jewish people and 
the Diaspora Jews.  
c. The policy will be based on direction, coordination and the implementation of measures that can 
affect population growth such as: encouraging the creation of families and their desire for children, 
strengthening families and removing barriers in their way, preventing unnecessary abortions—
through proper information and guidance; welfare assistance for families who have difficulties in 
raising their children, encouraging Aliyah; and taking steps to stop the emigration and to encourage 
Israelis living abroad to return to Israel. 
Government Decision Number 1596, 18.5.86 (1986) (Hebrew). 
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all groups under its purview. It seems that when a government declares that it is only interested in 
increasing the birth rates of the majority ethnic group, it violates the equality rights of minority 
groups, even if the policies adopted to achieve its purpose are applied equally to all.122 The mere 
knowledge that the state is more interested in the welfare of one group over the welfare of another 
denigrates the members of the second group and violates their dignity.123 
Another problem with the interests behind the Israeli abortion law is that the conditions 
under which it allows abortion are clearly crafted according to the dictates of Jewish religious 
law. Thus, the law authorizes pregnancy termination committees to approve abortion under very 
limited conditions, including where there is a valid medical or psychological concern that may 
affect the woman or the fetus, where the woman is under the age of marriage or over the age of 
forty, and where the pregnancy is out of wedlock.124 While the first two conditions are standard 
and highly restrictive, the last condition for approving an abortion—that the pregnancy is out of 
wedlock—may be religiously motivated.125 Under Jewish religious law, a child born out of 
wedlock to a married mother is considered religiously illegitimate, and even if the mother is 
unmarried, there is a relatively high risk that the child would be religiously illegitimate because its 
father may be unknown. Consequently, Israeli law allows women to abort if the fetus was 
conceived out of wedlock, and many of the abortions approved in Israel are approved under this 
section.126 No exception exists for abortion requested due to financial or social hardship.127 Thus, 
the  interest  motivating  Israel’s  restrictive  abortion  policy  is  the  increase  in  the  number  of  births  of  
religiously legitimate Jewish children. Here, again, while such an interest may have arguably been 
considered legitimate for a religious group, it cannot be considered legitimate for a state, which, at 
least according to liberal and human rights perceptions, is not allowed to impose religiously 
motivated restrictions on its population.128 
In addition to failing the legitimate  interest  prong,  Israel’s  restrictive  abortion  policy  fails  
the liberty and equality prong of the test suggested in this Article. Israeli law takes the power to 
decide  whether  to  abort  entirely  out  of  the  woman’s  hands,  entrusting  it  to  a  committee  of  experts 
who are themselves bound by the strict requirements of the law and cannot, for example, approve 
an abortion on financial grounds such as that the woman is financially incapable of taking care of 
                                                                
122  When the Center of Demography was charged with being racist because its mandate is to promote an 
increase in Jewish birth rates alone, the chairman of the Center responded that all policies decided by the Center will be 
applied equally to all citizens. Stopler, supra note 15, at 509-10. 
123  Id. at 511-12. 
124  Sections 312-321 of the Israeli Penal Act, 1977, stipulate the conditions for the operation of the 
Termination of Pregnancies Committees and specify the exact instances in which a committee is authorized to approve an 
abortion. Penal Law, 5737-1977, 31 LSI 84, §§ 312-21 (1976-1978) (Isr.). 
125  Stopler, supra note 15, at 488-89.  
126  See id. at 489; Press Release, Application for Pregnancy Termination in 2009, and Temporary Data 
2010, CENT. BUREAU STAT., 1, 6-8 (Sept. 20, 2011) (Isr.) (Hebrew), http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/ 
hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201105237 (stating that 51.4% of approved abortions involved an out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy). 
127  Id. at 488. Such a provision existed in the original law but was removed because of objections from anti-
abortionists and religious political parties. Id.  
128  See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, 191-92 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (positing that 
a political doctrine is unreasonable when it forces people to accept rules that give them fewer rights than others, such as 
when one faith is protected and another is not).  
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a child.129 The  usurpation  of  a  woman’s  control  over  her  body, the demand that she expose the 
most intimate details of her life before a committee of strangers and entrust her well-being, her 
health and her entire future in their hands, and her ultimate coercion, in some instances, into 
carrying the pregnancy to term,  all  constitute  severe  infringements  of  women’s  fundamental  right  
over their bodies as well as their fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, privacy, and equality. 
Furthermore, by compelling the woman to meet with a social worker whose aim is to persuade the 
pregnant woman not to file a request for abortion and to carry the pregnancy to term, the state 
exercises an unfair influence on women in their toughest moments, while demeaning them and 
showing disrespect for their capacity as moral agents.130 Moreover, unless there are exceedingly 
good reasons to believe otherwise, every human being should be regarded as an independent 
moral agent, capable of weighing all the relevant factors and making her own decisions, in light of 
her   best   interests.   Israel’s   refusal to view Israeli women as independent moral agents and to 
entrust women with the decision to abort, and even the decision to file a request for an approval of 
abortion, is a violation of their fundamental rights to autonomy and to dignity. 
ii. Germany 
This   last   point,   criticizing   the   state’s   clear   disrespect   for   women   as   moral   agents,   is  
similarly applicable to the German abortion scheme. German law declares abortion to be 
illegal.131 However, if the woman undergoes counseling before the abortion, and the abortion is 
carried out by a doctor during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and no less than three days 
after the counseling, then the abortion is not punishable.132 The German Penal Code declares that 
the interest motivating the restrictions on abortion, as well as the counseling requirement, is the 
right to life of the fetus.133 The wording of section 219 explicitly states the biased assumptions 
regarding  women’s  duty  to  sacrifice  on  which  the  mandatory  counseling  is  predicated: 
The counselling serves to protect unborn life. It should be guided by efforts to 
encourage the woman to continue the pregnancy and to open her to the 
prospects of a life with the child; it should help her to make a responsible and 
conscientious decision. The woman must thereby be aware that the unborn child 
has its own right to life with respect to her at every stage of the pregnancy and 
that a termination of pregnancy can therefore only be considered under the law 
in exceptional situations, when carrying the child to term would give rise to a 
                                                                
129  Stopler, supra note 15, at 488-90; Penal Law, 5737-1977, 31 LSI 84, §§ 312-21 (1976-1978) (Isr.). 
130  See Nanette Funk, Abortion Counselling and the 1995 German Abortion Law, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 33, 
58 (1996). 
131  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] 
3322, as amended, § 218 (Ger.), English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ 
stgb/englisch_stgb.html. 
132  Id. § 218a. See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 
88 ENTSCEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203, 1993 (Ger.) (abortion decision of the German 
Constitutional Court). 
133  STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] 
3322, as amended, § 219 (Ger.), English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/ 
englisch_stgb.html. 
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burden for the woman which is so serious and extraordinary that it exceeds the 
reasonable limits of sacrifice. The counselling should, through advice and 
assistance, contribute to overcoming the conflict situation which exists in 
connection with the pregnancy and remedying an emergency situation.134 
Thus, the restrictions placed on abortion by Israel and Germany, though differently 
fashioned  and  differently  motivated,  are  both  based  on  illegitimate  interests  and  violate  women’s  
rights to liberty and equality. It is interesting to note that the recent restrictions which many states 
in the United States are placing on abortion, including mandatory counseling and mandatory 
ultrasounds, are closely associated ideologically and practically with the German scheme. While 
each scheme of restrictions pursued by a state should be analyzed individually in order to 
establish its validity according to the suggested test, it seems safe to say that, at least as far as 
requirements such as mandatory ultrasounds that include the duty of the provider to display and 
describe  the  image  to  the  woman  are  concerned,  such  schemes  would  violate  women’s  rights  as  
much as the German restrictive abortion policy does.135 
3. State Refusal to Fund Abortion and to Guarantee Access to Them 
Unlike the restrictions on abortion discussed thus far, where governments actively 
restrict   women’s   right   to   abortion,   refusals   to   fund   abortions   and   to   guarantee   access   to   them  
constitute a different kind of restriction, since the government merely refuses to help women 
abort, but does not actually prevent them from doing so, or even regulate the process. In the 
United States, these types of restrictions have been affirmed by the Supreme Court as early as 
1977, four years after Roe, when the Court held that states are not obligated to cover abortions 
that are not necessary for health reasons under state Medicaid programs.136 These rulings were 
later expanded in Harris v. McRae, where the Court upheld restrictions that prevented any federal 
funding for abortions,   except   for   those   that   were   “required   because   a   woman’s   life   was  
endangered   or   if   the   pregnancy   resulted   from   rape   or   incest.”137 The court reasoned that not 
funding abortion for indigent women does not create an obstacle to access to abortion, since the 
obstacle  is  created  by  their  own  indigence  and  not  by  the  government’s  refusal  to  fund  abortion.138 
In the wake of Harris, these restrictions have been expanded to include a myriad of other abortion 
restrictions, and lately, some states are working to further expand them to cover private insurance 
health policies and clinics that include any abortion services through the Affordable Care Act.139 
The refusal to fund abortions for indigent women and to guarantee access to abortion 
violates both prongs of the test suggested in this Article. It violates the legitimate interest prong 
                                                                
134  Id. 
135  On state requirements for ultrasound see GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf. 
136  Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 465-66, 478 (1977); Soohoo, 
supra note 19, at 395-96. 
137  Soohoo, supra note 136, at 396; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).  
138  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17. 
139  See Soohoo, supra note 19, at 417-18; Nicole Huberfeld, With  Liberty  and  Access  for  Some:  The  ACA’s  
Disconnect  for  Women’s  Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1382-83 (2013).  
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since it is based on the interest of preserving the right to life of fetuses. As already discussed, a 
comparison of the extensive protection afforded to the right to life of fetuses against their 
mothers, with the legal protection given to the right to life in all other contexts, clearly exposes 
that   the   defense   of   the   fetus’s   right   to   life   is   based   on   biased   assumptions   regarding  women’s  
duties towards their fetuses, and not on a genuine concern with the right to life.140 As for the 
liberty and equality prong, preventing indigent women from having abortions by preventing 
funding  for  abortion  is  every  bit  as  restrictive  of  these  women’s  rights  to  liberty  and  equality  as  
state bans on abortion discussed above.141 Furthermore,   the  Court’s   reasoning   in  Harris clearly 
exposes how inadequate Roe’s   concept   of   freedom   of   choice   as   a   negative   right   is   to   ensure  
reproductive justice for all women. As the Harris Court  explains:  “[I]t  simply  does  not follow that 
a  woman’s  freedom  of  choice  carries  with  it  a  constitutional  entitlement  to  the  financial  resources  
to  avail  herself  of  the  full  range  of  protected  choices.”142 Clearly, restricting the right to abortion 
only to those women who can afford it is incompatible with the duty to respect the rights of all 
women with respect to liberty and equality, both because it discriminates against indigent women 
and because denies them the minimal conditions required to enable them to make a truly 
autonomous choice whether to continue their pregnancy.143 
C. Ideological Propaganda 
The question whether ideological propaganda is a legitimate means for achieving an 
increase in fertility is an intricate one. For example, was it legitimate for the Israeli Center of 
Demography   to   announce   in   the   1970s   that   “feminine   wholeness   combines   fertile   motherhood  
with   social   and   professional   status”   and   that   any   family   should   have   at   least   four   or   five  
children?144 Similarly, was it legitimate for the French government in the 1920s to bestow medals 
on women with five or more children?145 While ideological propaganda is undoubtedly less 
coercive than bans and restrictions on abortion and contraception, the propaganda described here 
would still seem to be incompatible with the test suggested in this Article. In terms of the 
legitimate interest prong, I would argue that although a state may have a legitimate interest in 
generally encouraging an increase in fertility rates, it is questionable whether an interest in 
encouraging women to have at least four or five children can be considered legitimate in a 
democratic society that respects individual rights. In a society that respects individual rights, 
government must accept that different people will make different choices with regard to whether 
they are interested in having children and how many children they want. The government may not 
promote a certain number of children as the desired norm. 
A similar problem arises in terms of the liberty and equality prong. Arguably, there is no 
harm in propaganda   promoting   the   importance   of   large   families   and   a   woman’s   joy   in  
motherhood. If all adults are free and autonomous moral agents, then they should all be capable of 
                                                                
140  See supra Part II.B.1. 
141  See Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Is Conditional Funding a Less Drastic Means?, 1 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 354, 
373-74 (2007).  
142  Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316. 
143  See Soohoo, supra note 19, at 397, 402. 
144  See Stopler, supra note 15, at 487.  
145  See Hoffmann, supra note 105, at 42. 
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assessing the validity of the propaganda and can act according to their best judgment. However, 
ideological propaganda is not a benign phenomenon. According to Foucault, ideology is the 
apparatus that allows the powerful to exercise power while at the same time masking it and 
legitimating its existence.146 The power exercised through ideology is masked by creating an 
illusion of free choice.147 The person whose actions are ideologically determined appears to be 
operating freely and under no coercion.148 In this manner, the powerful maintain control over the 
less powerful while masking the coercive and oppressive nature of their actions.149 As already 
discussed, states and communities have a significant interest in encouraging women to give birth 
and a tendency to view them as a means to that end and not as full human beings entitled to 
absolute respect for their human rights.150 Thus, in light of the common use of religious and 
national  ideologies  which  emphasize  a  woman’s  vocation  as  a  mother,  urging  her  to  give  birth  to  
as many children as possible and perpetuating her subordination, any ideological propaganda 
persuading women to procreate in order to promote ethnic, religious, or national goals should not 
be permissible. 
Thus I would argue that although a state may and should create a supportive environment 
in which parents can raise their children in the best conditions while at the same time developing 
their own skills and pursuing careers, it should not use ideological propaganda to encourage 
procreation. Presumably, creating a supportive environment for families would increase birth 
rates without any need for ideological pressures, since at least some of the people who have 
refrained from having more children due to the difficulties in raising them would decide to have 
them, if given the appropriate support.151 
D. Support for Families 
According to the test suggested in this Article to determine the legitimacy of various 
fertility policies, such policies would be legitimate if they are aimed at realizing an interest that 
can be considered legitimate in a democratic society that respects human rights, and if they 
promote  women’s   liberty  and  equality   rights.  Generally   speaking,  policies   that   support   families  
meet both prongs of this test. 
A survey done in twenty-three European countries in 2006 revealed that in all of the 
countries surveyed, people wanted more children than they actually had.152 Another survey 
revealed similar results in the United States.153 In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development  (“OECD”)  countries  that  are  concerned  with  their  falling  fertility  rates,  increases  in  
                                                                
146  See Shane Phelan, Foucault and Feminism, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 424 (1990). 
147  Stopler, supra note 28, at 12. 
148  Id. (citing Phelan, supra note 146, at 425). 
149  Id. 
150  See infra Part III. 
151  For example, according to surveys done by the Israeli Center of Demography, while the average birth 
rate in the Jewish population in Israel in the 1990s was around 2.6 children per family, the average number of children that 
people wanted was 3.5. Stopler, supra note 15, at 488. 
152 See OECD, DOING BETTER FOR FAMILIES 109 fig.3.9 (2011). 
153 See OECD, supra note 43, at 3 fig.2. 
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fertility are not promoted through direct interference with fertility.154 Instead, they are promoted 
through a range of family policies which are aimed at achieving several objectives that are, at 
least facially, all legitimate interests in democratic societies that respect human rights. These 
policies aim to: 
reconcile work and family responsibilities; increase parental employment and 
combat poverty; mobilise female labour supply and promote gender equality; 
promote conditions in which families can have the number of children they 
desire at the time of their choice; and, promote child development and equal 
opportunities among children for the future.155 
The increase in the cost of raising children is considered a key reason for falling fertility 
rates.156 These costs include both direct costs, such as child care, education, housing, food and 
clothing, and indirect costs, which are the costs of opportunities that the parents, mostly mothers, 
had to forgo in order to invest the necessary time in caring, educating, and raising the children.157 
One way of measuring the opportunity costs for mothers is to compare the total earning forgone 
by mothers during their career after childbirth with the earnings of childless women during the 
same period.158 The difference between the accumulative earnings of these two groups is termed 
the  “family  gap.”159 The  size  of  the  “family  gap”  varies  between  countries—women with children 
stand to accumulate between 42% and 89% of the earnings of otherwise similar childless women, 
depending on the country.160 
Through the use of appropriate family policies, governments have the power to both 
promote reproductive justice for women, and increase fertility rates. Studies show that different 
family policies have different impacts on fertility rates. Financial transfers such as baby bonuses 
have only a limited impact on fertility, as do the duration and payment of maternity (and 
paternity) leave.161 Formal childcare services have the clearest positive effects on fertility.162 
Nevertheless, according to research done in OECD countries: 
[I]t is the package of policies which helps reconcile work and family 
commitments (including flexible workplace practices, parental leave 
arrangements and early childhood education and care services) rather than each 
single component which exerts a positive influence on fertility outcomes and 
                                                                
154  See OECD, supra note 152, at 109. 
155  OECD, HOW CAN WE DO BETTER FOR OUR FAMILIES?: ISSUES, OUTCOMES, POLICY OBJECTIVES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (2011), available at www.oecd.org/els/soc/47701128.pdf; see OECD, supra note 152, at 107  .  
156  OECD, supra note 152, at 101. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 105. 
159  Id. 
160  Id. 
161  Id. at 110-13. 
162  Id. at 113-15. 
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intentions, and helps maintain total fertility rates close to two children per 
woman in France, New Zealand and the Nordic countries.163 
While governments do not have a duty to pursue specific policies merely because they 
promote a particular interest, such as increased fertility rates, they should be regarded as duty-
bound   to   pursue   policies   that   promote   women’s   liberty   and   equality   rights.   For   example,   all  
member states of the European Union and the union itself are subject to the duty to integrate 
gender equality into all their actions and policies.164 Similarly, all states which are parties to the 
Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  against  Women  (“CEDAW”)  are  
bound   to   “pursue   by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination   against   women”   and   to   “ensure,   through   law   and   other   appropriate   means,   the  
practical   realization  of   [the  principle  of   the   equality  of  men  and  women].”165 In the absence of 
policies such as paid maternity leave, the provision of high quality subsidized child-care, or 
protection  of  a  mother’s  right  to  express  breast  milk  at  work,  women  continue  to  suffer  losses  and  
discrimination as a result of using their reproductive capacities.166 Thus, not only are fertility 
policies that support families and alleviate the costs that women have to pay for bearing children 
legitimate policies, they are also an essential means of promoting reproductive justice.167 
III. ANTINATALIST FERTILITY POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS 
A. The Rational of Antinatalist Fertility Policies 
The global opinion on population and fertility policy has changed dramatically in the last 
several decades. The realization that military strength is dependent on the technological and 
economic superiority of the state, and not on the size of its population—and the recognition that 
the rapid increase in world population needs to be curbed—have resulted in the adoption of an 
antinatalist population agenda.168 The origin of antinatalist population and fertility policies can be 
found in the Malthusian population theory suggested by the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who 
claimed  as  early  as  the  eighteenth  century  that  the  growth  rate  of  the  world’s  population  should  be  
curbed or the population would outrun   the   world’s   resources.169 The antinatalist position was 
                                                                
163  Id. at 90. 
164  See Teresa Rees, Reflections on the Uneven Development of Gender Mainstreaming in Europe, 7 INT’L 
FEMINIST J. POL. 555-56 (2005). 
165  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 
U.N.T.S. 13. art. 2. Unfortunately, the United States has not signed the CEDAW. For an argument that signing the 
CEDAW would require the United States to ensure a far wider range of reproductive rights than it currently ensures, 
including positive reproductive rights, see Barbara Stark, The   Women’s   Convention,   Reproductive   Rights,   and   the  
Reproduction of Gender, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 261 (2011). 
166  See Bhushan, supra note 19, at 677, 683, 689; Elissa Aaronson Goodman, Breastfeeding or Bust: The 
Need  for  Legislation  to  Protect  a  Mother’s  Right  to  Express  Breast  Milk  at  Work, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 146, 150-
152 (2003). 
167  See discussion infra Part III.C. 
168  See Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3-4. 
169  THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 40-41, 44 (Electronic Scholarly 
Publishing Project 1998) (1798), available at http://www.esp.org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf.  
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adopted by the international community in the last several decades, first by the developed 
countries towards the developing countries, and then by the developing countries as well.170 
Interestingly, despite its liberal sensibilities, which allegedly prevent it from engaging in fertility 
policies within its own borders, the United States is considered the world leader in global 
population stabilization efforts, and the single largest contributor of population and family-
planning funds among industrialized countries.171 
Perhaps the most striking example of an antinatalist fertility policy is the Chinese one-
child policy. This policy, which was initiated by the Chinese government in 1979, was aimed at 
radically reducing the fertility rate in China.172 While the general goal of reducing fertility rates is 
a legitimate one, the goal of reducing fertility rates to one child per family cannot be considered a 
legitimate goal in a society that respects human rights; it completely disregards the reproductive 
autonomy of individual women and men to decide on the number of children to have. 
Furthermore, although officially the policy was not meant to be coercive, in practice it involved 
serious violations of rights, especially   women’s   rights,   that   were   carried   out   at   the   local   and  
provincial levels, including forced abortion and sterilization, severe monetary fines, and denial of 
public benefits.173 
B. Antinatalist Fertility Policies and the Rights of Women in Traditional Communities 
As the Cairo Plan of Action demonstrates, antinatalist fertility policies do not necessarily 
have  to  be  restrictive  and  disrespectful  of  women’s  rights,  but  can  be  supportive  and  conducive  to  
the   advancement  of  women’s   reproductive   rights.174 Supportive antinatalist fertility policies are 
fertility  policies   that  aim   to   improve  women’s   reproductive   rights  by  giving   them   the  means   to  
make free and informed choices, and the ability to lower their fertility rates. The Cairo Plan of 
Action has made this the stated goal of fertility and family-planning policies, and the international 
community has been promoting this goal in developing countries since 1995.175 Much less 
attention has been given to the fact that even in developed countries there are cohesive 
communities which deny women access to family planning for religious and ideological reasons, 
resulting in inordinately high birth rates. One example of such a community is the ultra-Orthodox 
Jewish community in Israel, whose average fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman.176 I will use 
the example of the ultra-Orthodox community to discuss whether a state is allowed, or perhaps 
even required, to try to find ways to ensure that women in the such communities are given full 
knowledge and access to all methods of family planning to better control their own fertility. I will 
                                                                
170  Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3-4. 
171  Craig Lasher, U.S. Population Policy Since the Cairo Conference, ENVTL. CHANGE & SECURITY 
PROJECT REP., Spring 1998, at 16, 16-17. 
172  See Peng, supra note 91, at 53. In 1979, the fertility rate in China was 2.8%, down from 5.8% in 1970. 
This sharp decline was achieved through the implementation of a two child policy starting in 1973, but the Chinese 
government felt that this decline was insufficient. Id. at 52-53.  
173  Savanyu, supra note 15, at 18-20. 
174  See Lasher, supra note 171, at 16. 
175  See id. at 21. 
176  Ahmad Hleihel, Fertility among Jewish and Muslim Women in Israel, by Level of Religiosity, 1979-
2009, at 12 Cent. Bureau of Statistics, Working Paper No. 60, 2011) (Isr.) (Hebrew). 
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argue that such a fertility policy will satisfy both prongs of the test suggested in this Article, since 
the interest in securing for women full knowledge and access to family planning is a legitimate 
interest in a democratic society that respects the individual rights of all those residing within it. 
Moreover,  realizing  this  interest  would  promote  women’s  liberty  and  equality  rights. 
It  is  well  established  that  “there  is  a  strong  correlation between high birth rates and the 
scarcity of rights and opportunities for women, lack of representation for women, their exclusion 
from   the   public   sphere,   and   higher   risks   for   the   health   of   both   women   and   children.”177 In 
addition, belonging to a large family might be detrimental to children, as very often large families 
lack the means to provide their children with sufficient material and emotional resources 
necessary for their proper development.178 As I explained elsewhere: 
The correlation between high fertility   rates   and   women’s   low   status   has   two  
interrelated explanations. Often the high number of children is not a result of a 
woman’s  free  choice  but  the  result  of  societal  pressures  and  of  a  lack  of  access  
to family planning. Additionally, the need to give birth to, and take care of, a 
large number of children makes it very difficult for a woman to develop herself, 
and her independence and autonomy. Moreover, in patriarchal societies . . . such 
as the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in Israel, [compelling women to give] 
birth to large numbers of children and dedicate their time to fulfilling [their] 
children’s  needs,  serves  as  an  important  control  mechanism  meant  to  ensure  that  
women are too busy to revolt against their own subordination.179 
Ultra-Orthodox women are compelled to give birth through the control and manipulation 
of meaning and knowledge, and not through the use of physical force.180 There are three ways in 
which this control is achieved: control over the creation of social meaning; control over 
education; and control over access to outside sources of information.181 This is a classic example 
of  Foucault’s  insight,  mentioned  above,  that  ideology  allows  the  powerful  to  exercise  power  while  
at the same time masking it and legitimating its existence.182 First, the social and ideological 
                                                                
177  Stopler, supra note 28, at 11(citing Nancy E. Riley, Gender, Power, and Population Change, 
POPULATION BULL., May 1997, at 2). 
178  See Sonalde Desai, When Are Children from Large Families Disadvantaged? Evidence from Cross-
National Analyses, 49 POPULATION STUD. 195 (1995). 
179  Stopler, supra note 28, at 11-12 (footnote omitted). See Diana D.M. Babor, Population Growth and 
Reproductive Rights in International Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 83, 93-95 & nn.43, 48-49 (1999); Alice 
Shalvi,  ‘Renew  Our  Days  as  of  Old’:  Religious  Fundamentalism  and  Social Change in the Modern Jewish State, in THE 
FREEDOM TO DO GOD’S WILL: RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 75, 75-80 (Gerrie ter Haar & James J. 
Busuttil eds., 2003); Ronit Ir-Shay, Family Planning: A Halakhic-Gender Perspective, 12 NASHIM 95, 96 (2006). Ir-Shay 
provides as an example the response of one of the most influential rabbinic decisors (poskim) of contemporary ultra-
Orthodoxy,   Rabbi   Joshua   Neuwirth:   “According   to   [Neuwirth],   for   the   woman   to   place   her   own   wishes   before   the  
obligation to procreate,  even  if  having  children  is  merely  postponed,  is  equivalent  to  the  couple  ‘living  like  animals.’”  Ir-
Shay, supra, at 115. 
180  Stopler, supra at 28, at 12. 
181  Id. at 12-13; Dorothy E. Roberts, Rust v. Sullivan and the Control of Knowledge, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 587, 617 (1993). 
182  See Phelan, supra note 146. 
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discourse which motivates the closed patriarchal community and determines the meaning of the 
social reality within which the woman understands her life and her vocation is created exclusively 
by its male leaders.183 Contemporary ultra-Orthodox Halachic rulings almost invariably present 
constant pregnancies and large families as mandatory religious norms.184 Thus, for example, the 
male spiritual leaders of the community bestowed a rare honor on a mother of eighteen children 
by defining  her  as  a  “righteous  woman”  because  of  her  high  number  of  children.185 This is a clear 
message to women in the community that giving birth to as many children as possible is the only 
path to righteousness for a woman. The results of this hegemonic rabbinical discourse are 
described by one of the rabbis who object to it as follows: 
[T]here are families that are larger than their physical, mental, economic and 
educational capacities allow and that are on the verge of disaster. The mother 
can no longer keep herself going, they cannot take care of the children . . . and it 
is a big blasphemy to think that the situation is mandated by the Halakhic norms 
and that nothing can be done to change it.186 
Second,  “the  main  objective  of  the  ultra-Orthodox  women’s  education system is to instill 
in girls a complete identification with the oppressive social system to which she belongs, and to 
her  subordinated  status  and  procreative  role  within  it.”187 A good example of that is the credo of 
the founder of the Beit-Ya’akov   College   for   Girls   in   Bnei   Brak,   who   explained   that   “[i]f   we  
succeed in instilling in our girl students that the purpose of their studies is to aspire to emulate our 
matriarchs,   who   did   not   study,   then   we   have   succeeded   in   educating   our   daughters.”188 The 
socialization process of ultra-Orthodox women, which is focused on modesty, silence, and 
obedience,189 makes it very hard for them to voice any objections to the religious and communal 
dogma they are taught, or even to conceptualize such objections.190 
Proverbs such as   “The   daughter   of   the   king   is   all   dignified  within[]”   and   “A  
woman’s   voice   is   ervah (impure)”   in   their   orthodox   interpretations   restrict  
women to the private sphere, and enjoin them from having any voice in the 
public sphere—both metaphorically and literally—and from participating in any 
                                                                
183  Stopler, supra at 28, at 13. 
184  Id. (citing Ir-Shay, supra note 179). 
185  Id.; Tamar Rotem, How Many Children Does It Take to Be Righteous, HAARETZ.COM, (Nov. 20, 2006, 
12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/how-many-children-does-it-take-to-be-righteous-1.205533. The 
article  discusses  a  mother  of  eighteen  children  who  was  described  as  a  “righteous  woman”  for  having  so  many  children  by  
a rabbi mourning her premature death. See also Ir-Shay, supra note 179, at 112, 119. 
186  Ronit Ir-Shay, “Be   Fertile   and   Increase   and   Fill   the   Earth”—Between Hegemonic Discourse to 
Subversive Discourse in the Halakhic Rulings on Procreation, 31 OPINIONS 35, 37 (2007) (Hebrew). 
187  Stopler, supra at 28, at 14; see TAMAR EL’OR, EDUCATED AND IGNORANT: ULTRAORTHODOX JEWISH 
WOMEN AND THEIR WORLD 89 (Haim Watzman trans., 1994). 
188  TAMAR EL’OR, supra note 187, at 65. 
189  See Rachel   Elior,   “A Beautiful Woman with No Eyes,” in BLESSED THOUGH FOR MAKING ME A 
WOMAN? THE WOMAN IN JUDAISM FROM THE BIBLE TO MODERN TIMES 37, 48-49 (D. Joel et al. eds., 1999) (Hebrew). 
190  Stopler, supra note 28, at 15. 
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form of policy setting or decision making. Any woman who defies these rules is 
considered immodest, impure, and promiscuous.191 
Thirdly, another important means for achieving high fertility rates is the prohibition on 
the use of contraception without prior rabbinical authorization.192 Moreover, even when a woman 
is given permission to use contraceptives, she is forbidden from discussing their use with her 
friends, so as not to tempt other women to use them.193 
Just as the correlation  between  high  fertility  rates  and  women’s  low  status  is  clear,  so  too  
a   clear   correlation   has   been   found   between   advancing  women’s   status   and   decreasing   fertility.  
There is general agreement that the best way to decrease fertility within populations in which 
fertility is too high is by empowering women, strengthening their social status, and enabling them 
to resist the dictates of traditional communities which demand that they give birth to large 
numbers of children.194 Nevertheless, two interrelated objections can be raised against allowing 
the state to take any steps to decrease fertility rates in traditional communities. One is the liberal 
objection, a variant of which was already discussed at some length and rejected, which precludes 
state involvement in the private sphere and especially in procreation decisions.195 The liberal 
objector would posit that community, just like family, is part of the private sphere and that 
therefore the state has no business intervening in it. Such intervention infringes on the individual 
right to privacy, freedom of association, and freedom of religion.196 As already discussed, from a 
feminist perspective, intervention in the private sphere, including in procreation decisions, is 
sometimes  necessary  to  protect  women’s  rights,  since  much  of  women’s  subordination  occurs  in  
the private sphere and involves control over procreation.197 Because in these cases freedom of 
association and freedom of religion are used to subordinate women by controlling and exploiting 
their procreative powers,   the   state  has  a   legitimate   interest   to   intervene   to  both  ensure  women’s  
knowledge and access to family planning, and to prevent their exploitation. 
A related objection would posit that by taking such measures, the state infringes on the 
community’s  right to culture, threatening its unique values and ways of life. In recent years, rights 
and identity claims of cultural communities have come to the forefront of the social and political 
discourse and of the discourse of rights.198 The dilemmas that arise from the need to combine the 
liberal  state’s  commitment  to  universality,  equality,  and  neutrality  between  various  conceptions  of  
the  good,  with  traditional  communities’  demand  to  preserve  their  unique  ways  of  life,  boundaries,  
and culture, are at the heart of the multicultural discourse.199 Advocates of multiculturalism posit 
                                                                
191  Stopler, supra note 28, at 15 (footnotes omitted); see Elior, supra note 189, at 43-44, 48-50. 
192  Stopler, supra note 28, at 14. 
193  Id. (citing The Prevention of Pregnancy, in 6 HALACHIC MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Avraham Steinberg 
ed., Jerusalem 1996), available at http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/refua/encyc/menia.htm; Ir-Shay, supra note179, at 119). 
194  See Babor, supra note 179, at 93-94 & nn.43, 48-49. 
195  See supra Part I.A. 
196  See Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105 (1992) (discussing 
liberal arguments against intervention in traditional communities).  
197  See supra Part I.C. 
198  See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA, at 
viii (2002). 
199  See generally id.; WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY 
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that the community to which a person belongs, with its specific culture, language and practices, 
provides the necessary context within which she can develop and exercise her autonomous 
capacity to choose her values and her way of life.200 Alternatively, it provides the necessary 
context within which her identity is formed and within which she understands herself.201 
Consequently, it is argued that the preservation of the community can justify according 
preferential treatment to communities that will allow them to preserve their cultures, and may 
even  justify  permitting  communities  to  restrict  some  of  their  members’  rights,  though  not  the  most  
fundamental ones.202 
Following this line of thinking, the leaders of the ultra-Orthodox community could claim 
that not only should the state refrain from interfering with the ultra-Orthodox procreation 
practices, but also that the state should actively support these practices as they are an essential 
component of their culture and should therefore be preserved and supported. I would posit that 
although the right to culture is an important right that must be respected, the argument for the 
preservation of culture can justify neither support for, nor noninterference with, the inordinately 
high fertility rates in the ultra-Orthodox community and the manner in which they are achieved. 
The  preservation  of  a  culture  is  not  an  interest  that  can  justify  the  grievous  violation  of  women’s  
fundamental rights to equality, autonomy, and bodily integrity that occurs as a result of the 
procreative practices of the ultra-Orthodox community. Demands for cultural accommodation 
should  only  be  met  if  they  promote  what  Professor  Nancy  Fraser  terms  “parity  of  participation,”  
both within the group and between groups, i.e., if they promote the ability of all adult members of 
the  society   to   interact  with  one  another  as  peers  by  ensuring   their   independence  and  “voice”  on  
the physical, as well as on the symbolic level.203 The ultra-Orthodox procreation practices have 
the exact opposite effect on women. 
Another reason to not accommodate ultra-Orthodox procreation practices is that, in fact, 
the high fertility rates of the ultra-Orthodox are not an age-old cultural practice, but a relatively 
new phenomenon resulting from a combination of religious indoctrination with the structure of 
child allowances in Israel favoring families with four children or more.204 Thus, the current 
fertility rates of the ultra-Orthodox community are not an age-old practice that has formed the 
backbone of communal existence for generations; its preservation is therefore not essential to the 
                                                                
RIGHTS (1995); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); CHARLES 
TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
200  See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 199, at 126. 
201  See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 199, at 61, 63-65. 
202  Id. at 59, 61; KYMLICKA, supra note 199, at 126, 152, 164-70. Although Kymlicka distinguishes 
between  a  community’s  right  for  external  protections,  which  he  supports,  and  its  right  to  place  internal  restrictions  on  its  
members, which he rejects, he nevertheless would not intervene in internal cultural practices that violate human rights 
unless these practices constitute systematic and grave violations of rights such as slavery, genocide, or torture. See 
KYMLICKA, supra note 199, at 126, 152, 164-70. 
203  Nancy Fraser & Alex Honneth, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXCHANGE 36-41 (Joel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke trans., 2003); see also Chaim Gans, Individuals’  Interest  
in the Preservation of Their Culture, 1 L. & ETHICS HUMAN RTS. 6, 16 (2007) (positing that measures for cultural 
preservation are only legitimate as long as they do not significantly violate the human rights and freedoms of both 
members and non-members of groups.); Stopler, supra note 28, at 33 n.98. 
204  MORIA AVNIMELECH & YOSSI TAMIR, A SOCIAL TIME BOMB: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF WELFARE 
IN ISRAEL, 81-82, 86-88 (2002) (Hebrew). 
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continued existence of the community. Consequently, I would argue that Israel should educate 
ultra-Orthodox girls and women, disseminate information to them, and guarantee free access to 
family-planning services in order to allow them to gain more control over their procreative 
practices. 
IV. EUGENIC FERTILITY POLICIES 
A. Types of Eugenic Fertility Policies 
Unlike pronatalist and antinatalist fertility policies that focus on fertility as a means for 
increasing or decreasing the size of the population, eugenic fertility policies focus on control over 
fertility as a means for improving the quality of the population. Sir Francis Galton has defined 
eugenics   as   “the   science  which   deals  with   all   influences   that   improve   the   inborn   qualities   of   a  
race . . .   [and]   develop   them   to   the   utmost   advantage.”205 Because eugenic fertility policies 
rationalize disparate treatment of different population groups according to their alleged aptitude, 
they justify the imposition of disparate fertility policies on disempowered minorities on an 
allegedly  scientific  basis,  and  bring  to  the  forefront  the  inextricable  links  between  women’s  rights  
and the rights of other disempowered minorities. The eugenic approach to fertility had gained 
popularity at the close of the nineteenth century. Thus, in 1907, United States President Theodore 
Roosevelt had warned that the upper-class   white   women’s   tendency   to   have   small   families 
constituted   “race   suicide”   because   it   resulted   in   “a   tendency   to   the   elimination   instead   of   the  
survival  of   the   fittest.”206 A  similar  concern   for   the  quality  of   the   “British   stock”  was   raised   in  
Britain due to the high fertility rates among the lower class and the decreasing fertility rates 
among the middle and upper classes.207 On the basis of eugenic principles, in 1927 the United 
States Supreme Court approved the forced sterilization of the mentally challenged, reasoning that 
sterilization was necessary in  order  to  avoid  a  world  “swamped  with  incompetence.”208 In Justice 
Holmes’s   infamous   words:   “Three   generations   of   imbeciles   are   enough.”209 This decision has 
never been overturned, and it was not until 1974 that the federal government banned sterilization 
without consent in hospitals that receive federal funds.210 The eugenic approach also served to 
justify anti-miscegenation laws in the United States,211 and immigration policies that gave priority 
                                                                
205  Francis Galton, Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims, 10 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1904). 
206  Dennis Hodgson & Susan Cotts Watkins, Feminists and Neo-Malthusians: Past and Present Alliances, 
23 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 469, 473 (1997) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
207  Francesca Klug, ‘Oh  to  Be  in  England’:  The  British  Case  Study, in WOMAN—NATION—STATE 16, 21 
(Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias eds., 1989). 
208  Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Holmes further reasoned that it is better to prevent those 
who are clearly incompetent from having children than to have to kill those children because of crimes they will commit 
or to watch them starve in the streets due to their lack of competence. Id. 
209  Id.  
210  Powell, supra note 15, at 484. 
211  On eugenics as the basis for anti-miscegenation laws, see Paul Lombardo, Eugenic Laws against Race 
Mixing, IMAGE ARCHIVE ON AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT, http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay7text.html 
(last visited Mar. 28, 2015). An example of such a law is the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which forbade 
marriage between a white person and any person who had a trace of non-white blood in order to prevent watering down of 
the white race. Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975). 
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to Anglo-Saxon immigrants to the United States and Britain.212 After eugenic principles formed 
the basis for Nazi Aryan race theory and served as an impetus for mass exterminations during the 
Second World War, eugenics has fallen into disrepute.213 Nevertheless, it continued to serve as the 
covert basis for population policies in various countries.214 One example of an implicitly eugenic 
fertility policy in the United States is the family cap for welfare recipients, which is aimed at 
discouraging childbirth among welfare recipients by failing to increase benefits when an 
additional child is born while a parent is receiving income support.215 This program targets mostly 
poor African-American women.216 
B. Restrictions on Interracial and Interreligious Marriages as Eugenic Fertility Policies 
In   addition   to   controlling   women’s   fertility rates, states and communities control 
women’s  reproductive  capacity  by  controlling  whom  they  can  marry,   in  what  may  be   seen  as  a  
eugenic attempt to maintain the purity of racial or religious communities and their boundaries.217 
For example, during Apartheid, South African law prevented women from becoming sexually 
involved with men from different racial groups than their own.218 In the United States, anti-
miscegenation state laws that criminalized interracial marriage were only struck down by the 
Supreme Court in 1967, when it held in Loving v. Virginia that such laws were 
unconstitutional.219 The act that served as the basis for the statutory scheme under which the 
Lovings were convicted was the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which forbade marriage 
between a white person and any person who had a trace of non-white blood, in order to prevent 
watering down of the white race.220 Accordingly,  section  5  of  the  Act  stated  that  “the  term  ‘white  
person’   shall   apply   only   to   the   person   who   has   no   trace   whatsoever   of any blood other than 
Caucasian.”221 The trial judge who convicted the Lovings reasoned that: 
                                                                
212  On British immigration policy and its relation to eugenics, see Klug, supra note 207, at 25. 
On U.S. immigration policy and its relation to eugenics, see Paul Lombardo, Eugenics Laws Restricting Immigration, 
IMAGE ARCHIVE ON AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT, http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay9text.html (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2015). 
213  See Hodgson & Cotts Watkins, supra note 206, at 478. 
214  See, e.g., Jana Grekul, Harvey Krahn & Dave Odynak, Sterilizing   the  “Feeble-minded”:  Eugenics   in  
Alberta, Canada, 1929-1972, 17 J. HIST. SOC. 358 (2004) (discussing sterilization of the feeble minded that continued in 
Canada until 1972); Klug, supra note 207, at 26 (regarding an immigration policy guided by eugenic principles in Britain). 
215  See Powell, supra note 15, at 490-91; see also Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their 
Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151 (2006). 
216  See Powell, supra note 15, at 490; see also JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 210-14 
(2014). 
217  Stopler, supra note 93, at 170. 
218  Id. (citing Anthias & Yuval-Davis, supra note 98, at 9). 
219  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
220  Id. at 6-7; Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975). 
221  Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, ch. 371, § 5, 1924 Va. Acts 534,535 (repealed 1975).  
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Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he 
placed them on separate continents. And, but for the interference with his 
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he 
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.222 
Anti-miscegenation laws constituted fertility policies because preventing the birth of 
children  of  “mixed”  race  was  a  central purpose of these laws.223 There can be no doubt that the 
desire of a state to maintain racial purity is a clearly illegitimate interest. A tougher question 
arises with regard to laws that restrict interreligious marriages for the purpose of preserving the 
boundaries of religious communities, as is the case in Israel. Interreligious marriages are not 
prohibited under Israeli law. However, because Israeli law recognizes only religious marriages 
conducted by religious tribunals of recognized religious communities, people of different 
religions cannot marry each other in Israel.224 Thus, Israel has transformed religious prohibitions 
that   aim   “to   protect   the   boundaries   of   the   various   religious   communities   by   prohibiting  
[religiously mixed] marriages . . . into compulsory state laws that apply to all, regardless of their 
religious   convictions.”225 A desire to maintain the boundaries of the Jewish community, and 
especially  to  prevent  the  loss  of  Jews  to  other  religions,  has  played  a  major  role  in  the  legislature’s  
decision to adopt this statutory scheme. 
When introducing the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) 
Act in 1953[,] the Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs explained that one of 
the purposes of granting legal recognition exclusively to religious marriages 
was to exclude the possibility of mixed marriages that might result in the 
conversion of Jews to other [religions]. Similarly, when it became known that 
the Muslim Sharia court[] . . . [is] willing to marry Muslim men to Jewish 
women, the Ministry for Religious Affairs instructed the Sharia courts to refrain 
from conducting such marriages.226 
Can a distinction be made between a statutory scheme that prevents interracial marriages, 
such as the historic anti-miscegenation laws in the United States, and a statutory scheme that 
                                                                
222  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting trial judge) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
223  An additional purpose of such laws was to prevent black men who were deemed inferior and animalistic 
from having sexual relations with idealized pure white women. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW 222 (1998). 
224  Stopler, supra note 93, at 170; see British Order in Council Making Provision for the Administration of 
the Mandated Territory of Palestine, Aug. 10. 1922, 116 B.S.P. 204, 215 (1922); Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage 
and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 (1952-1953) (Isr.). 
225  Stopler, supra note 93, at 170. 
226  Stopler, supra note 93, at 170 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see Zvi H. Triger, There is a State 
for Love: Marriage and Divorce between Jews in Israel, in TRIALS OF LOVE 173, 204 (Orna Ben-Naftali and Hannah 
Naveh eds., 2005) (Hebrew); PINHAS SHIFFMAN, CIVIL OR SACRED: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ALTERNATIVES IN 
ISRAEL—A NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE CHANGE 12 (2001) (Hebrew), available at http://www.acri.org.il/he/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/kadat-o-kadin.pdf.  “It  is  interesting  to  note  that  although  according  to  Islam  the  Sharia  courts  can  
marry Muslim men to non-Muslim women, they cannot marry Muslim women to non-Muslim men, most probably 
because  of  the  assumption  that  the  woman  will  eventually  convert  to  the  man’s  religion,  and  thus  become  non-Muslim.”  
Stopler, supra note 93, at 177 n.20. 
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prevents inter-religious marriages, such as the Israeli marriage laws? One clear distinction 
between the two schemes is the degree of coercion that is involved. While the American scheme 
criminalized interracial marriages, the Israeli scheme merely prevents interreligious marriages 
within state borders, while recognizing interreligious marriages that have been conducted legally 
in a foreign country. Another important distinction that might be offered pertains to the 
motivations underlying the two schemes. One could argue that there is a substantial difference 
between a scheme that prevents interracial marriages due to the belief that the white race is 
superior and should therefore not interbreed with the black race, and one that prevents 
interreligious marriages in order to preserve communities and prevent their extinction. While the 
former is motivated by sheer racism, the latter can presumably be justified using communitarian 
and multicultural arguments.227 Such arguments are often found compelling in the arena of family 
law  since  “[f]amily  law  in  particular  is  regarded  as  having  a  crucial  role  in  the  preservation  of  the  
community and the demarcation of its borders, and it has even been argued that the function of 
family law vis-à-vis the community is parallel to the function of citizenship law vis-à-vis the 
sovereign   state.”228 Consequently, one could argue that the need of the various religious 
communities in Israel to preserve and demarcate their boundaries constitutes a legitimate interest 
that justifies a legal scheme that recognizes only religious marriages between community 
members.229 I disagree. Protecting the boundaries of religious communities through restrictions on 
intermarriage may be a legitimate interest for communities themselves, who may try to achieve it 
through private means such as teaching and persuasion. However, protecting religious 
communities through restrictions on marriages cannot be considered a legitimate interest for a 
state that must remain neutral with respect  to  its  citizens’  religious  affiliation  and  may  not  allocate  
or deny rights according to religious affiliation.230 
Thus,   Israel’s   restrictions  on   interreligious  marriages  do  not  meet   the  first  prong  of   the  
test suggested in this Article—the legitimate interest prong. Furthermore, they do not meet the 
second prong of the test—the liberty and equality prong. The preservation of community 
boundaries in this manner results in serious violations of the rights of individuals within and 
outside the communities: women’s   right   to   equality   which   is   violated   by   the   imposition   of  
patriarchal   and   discriminatory   religious   laws;;   individuals’   right   to   family   life   which   is   denied  
because   religious   restrictions   prevent   them   from  marrying   each   other;;   and   individuals’   right   to 
freedom of conscience and freedom from religion which is violated by the imposition of religious 
laws on people who are not religious.231 Thus, if, as already argued, measures for cultural 
                                                                
227  See discussion of such arguments in Part IV.B of this Article.  
228  Stopler, supra note 93, 176 n.10 (citing AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: 
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 45-47 (2001)). 
229  Thus, for example, the former Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, has expressed 
the opinion that the limitation of marriages of Jewish Israelis to religious marriages held before the rabbinical courts can 
be  justified  on  the  basis  of  Israel’s  character  as  a  Jewish  and  democratic  state.  Ruth  Gavison,  A Jewish and Democratic 
State: Challenges and Risks, in MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE 213, 273-74 (Menahem 
Mautner, Avi Sagi, & Ronen Shamir, eds., 1998) (Hebrew). 
230  See STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND 
STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 6-10 (2d ed. 2009); see generally CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: THE 
CHIMERA OF NEUTRALITY (John T. S. Madeley & Zsolt Enyedi eds., 2003) (discussing church-state relations in 
contemporary Europe).  
231  See SHIFFMAN, supra note 226, at 5-9. 
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preservation are only legitimate as long as they promote parity of participation, or at least as long 
as they do not significantly violate the human rights and freedoms of both members and non-
members of groups, 232 then a statutory scheme allowing only for religious marriages within 
recognized religious communities is illegitimate and must be altered. 
Furthermore, one must not forget that the preservation of culture and community 
argument may serve as a pretext for racism. For example, while many countries in Europe claim 
that their recent immigration and naturalization restrictions are the result of the need to preserve 
their national cultures, some regard these restrictions as manifestations of covert racism.233 Others 
see additional support for this view in the fact that at the same time that these countries restrict 
immigration,   they   enact   proactive   fertility   policies   aimed   at   increasing   the   local   population’s  
under-replacement fertility rates.234 Similarly, the strict preservation of community boundaries 
through religious marriages often stems from racism and from the belief that  one’s   religion  and  
co-religionists   are   chosen   and   superior   to   others.   The   Israeli   Ministry   for   Religious   Affairs’s  
instruction to the Sharia courts not to marry Muslim men to Jewish women may suggest such a 
line of thinking.235 
V. CONCLUSION 
The liberal assumption that governments must not set fertility policies is flawed in both 
theory and practice. It is flawed in practice because whether intentionally or not, and whether they 
admit to it or not, governments set policies that directly and indirectly affect fertility. It is flawed 
in  theory  because  the  government  must  take  reproduction  into  account  in  order  to  ensure  women’s  
rights to liberty and equality. Thus, when a government does not fund abortion and does not 
guarantee free and easy access to it, the government prevents low-income women from obtaining 
abortions, and condemns them to a life of hardship and misery. When a government does not 
guarantee paid maternity leave, it makes it impossible for women to compete in the job market on 
an equal footing with men. When a government refuses to intervene in the private sphere to 
ensure that women in traditional communities have full information on and access to family 
planning, it allows for their continued exploitation by their community. At the same time, past and 
present experience has taught us that fertility policies initiated by states and communities to 
respond to their population needs have, more often than not, ignored the rights of the women 
recruited to carry them through, and have used women as a means to an end, rather than as an end 
in themselves. 
Consequently,  while  Foucault’s  aversion  to  biopolitics  is  understandable,  those  who  are  
concerned  with  women’s   rights   to   liberty   and   equality   have  no   choice  but   to   acknowledge   that  
biopolitics occurs all around us, and to try to offer ways in which it can be harnessed to advance 
women’s   rights   rather   than   to   exploit   women.   This   Article   has   attempted   to   do   just   that   by  
suggesting a test for assessing the legitimacy of fertility policies. It has identified three types of 
interests that fertility policies may serve: legitimate state and group interests; individual liberty 
                                                                
232  See Fraser & Honneth, supra note 203, at 36; Gans, supra note 203.  
233  Klug, supra note 207, at 25-26; see also Jean Hampton, Immigration, Identity, and Justice, in JUSTICE IN 
IMMIGRATION 67, 84 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995) (discussing generally how state justifications of immigration 
restrictions on the grounds of preservation of national cultures are in fact a cover for racism). 
234  Klug, supra note 207, at 32. 
235  See SHIFFMAN, supra note 226. 
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interests, such as autonomy and privacy; and individual equality interests. 
The validity of a given fertility policy should be assessed by examining it against these 
interests, and two rules should guide this examination. First, similar to any other government 
policy,  fertility  policies  should  only  be  based  on  a  state’s  need  to  promote  legitimate  interests  (the  
“legitimate   interests   prong”).   Second,   due   to   the   primacy   of   individual   rights,   even   legitimate  
state and group interests in fertility can only be realized while respecting and promoting 
individual   rights,  especially   individual  women’s  rights,   to  both   liberty  and  equality  (the  “liberty 
and  equality  prong”).  Any  policy  should  satisfy  both  prongs  of  the  test  concurrently  in  order  to  be  
considered legitimate. Fertility policies are here to stay, and they hold both a threat and a promise. 
It is our task to demand their transparency and to carefully scrutinize them in order to ensure that 
they are used to promote, rather than to obstruct, rights. 
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